BANK OF JAMAICA

REGIONAL MONETARY CONFERENCE

ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD

29th-30th March 1969

AGENDA ITEM I

THE NEW STERLING AGREEMENTS

1969 Regional monetary Studies Conference

THE NEW STERLING AGREEMENTS

Introduction

In this paper, the new sterling agreements between the U.K. and the overseas sterling area countrice are examined. These agreements were concluded under pressure from the U.K. Authorities in order to protect sterling. Both sides however, gained something from these agreements. The U.K. Authorities by stabilising the sterling balances, were able to corden off an area of potential danger to sterling while the overseas sterling area countries obtained a guarantee of some 90 per cent of their "official" reserves against a future devaluation of sterling.

These agreements will expire in the period 1971-73 and so for as the Commonwealth Caribbean is concerned, the question that has to be considered sooner or later, is what direction do we take when these arrangements come to an end.

The Storling Balances

The sterling balances orginated largely as debts to wartime creditors of the U.K. Working balances were always held in London, in sterling, but these rose from about £500mm. at the out-break of the second world war to about £3,570mm. at the end of the war. Since then the largest holders - India, Egypt, Argentina and several commonwealth countries - have run down their balances while other countries such as Australia, Hong Kong, Kuwait, the Persian Gulf States and the Caribboan Area have built theirs up.

These balances fall into three main categories:

(i) Balancesheld by residents of non-sterling area countries

The greater part of those are now privately held. Over the years these balances have increased in total but there have been marked short-term fluctuations, reflecting confidence in sterling and interest rate differentials.

(ii) Privately hold storling area balances

These have risen steadily since the war; they show little sensitivity to confidence and the rising trend is mainly a reflection of the strong balance of payments position of certain overseas sterling area countries and the growing value of trade done in sterling.

(iii) Official balances of the overseas sterling area (OSA) countries

The composition of those balances had under-gons much change since the war as some countries have run down their sterling reserves while others have built up theirs. Up to the early 1960s, the total was relatively stable and the sterling proportion of the total reserves of the OSA countries remained high and relatively constant. During the 1960s, an increase in sterling area countries' trading and political links with the non-sterling area and their growing reliance on non-sterling sources for investment and aid led to a diversification of their reserves. This took the form mainly of an accumulation of non-sterling assets when total reserves were rising and for the sterling area as a whole, there was no significant fall in officially held sterling.

The short-term fluctuations particularly in the balances of non-sterling holders could make heavy demands on the reserves of the U.K. and the strains which could be set up by these fluctuations were recognised as a potential source of instability for sterling and the international monetary system as a whole. In June 1966, a facility was made available by a number of central banks to effect the effect on the U.K.'s reserves of fluctuations in the sterling balances. This facility was not intended to help finance deficits in the U.K. balance of payments but solely to rolieve stresses arising from the international use of sterling. Swap arrangements were made available to the Bank of England on a short-term basis, on which drawings could be made when the sterling balances fall below a fixed starting level.

In September 1967 gross starling balances of the OSA countries amounted to £2,834mm, including £244mm, held by the Caribbean Area. In June 1968 these balances amounted to £2,796mm, including £257mm, held by the Caribbean Area. It should be noted that while some sterling area countries reduced their sterling balances before and after devaluation, the Caribbean Area built up theirs. In the period 1963 to 1967 the gross sterling balances of the Caribbean Area increased by £47mm.

Storling after devaluation

The financial links between the U.K. and the rest of the storling area were considered to have been loosened by the devaluation of 1967. The larger storling area countries did not devalue and as a result they suffered losses both in terms of dollar purchasing power and in terms of their own currency. Since devaluation, sterling has not enjoyed the stability originally /anticipated.

anticipated. There have been frequent crises generated both by international monetary developments and developments in the U.K. economy. This has resulted in a good deal of uncertainty about the viability of starling as a reserve currency and some OSA countries, wary of another starling devaluation, began diversifying their reserves at an accolarated pace. There was a fall in officially held starling balances as considerable sums were switched into other forms of reserves. Between March and June 1968, gross aterling balances of the OSA countries fell by £324mm. At the time of the starling devaluation in November 1967, some 75 per cent of the Sank of Jamaica's external reserves were held in starling but by the time the starling area negotiations began in July, this proportion had fallen to 54 per cent. Diversification, if carried far enough, could have precipitated another crisis and perhaps another devaluation of starling.

The Hong Kong Arrangement

Hong Kong, one of the large sterling holders suffered substantial losses as a result of the sterling devaluation; this territary followed sterling by devaluing the Hong Kong dollar to the full 14.3 per cent but subsequently revaluing it by 10 per cent. Concern over its sterling reserves led Hong Kong to exert pressure on the U.K. Authorities for diversification of its reserves. This resulted in the "Hong Kong Arrangement" the main features of which are:

- (a) Up to 50 per cunt of Hong Kong's official external reserves to a limit of £150mm, could be held in U.K. Government Bonds denominated in Hong Kong dollars,
- (b) Bonds would be issued with a seven-year maturity,
- (c) Bonds would be encashable by the Government of Hong Kong in case of liquidity need or balance of payments purposes or by agreement with H.M.G.,
- (d) The arrangement is subject to review by either side, or in any case in December 1969 if the Government of Hong Kong so requests.

This arrangement and the arrangements of June 1966, set the pattern of the subsequent "Sterling Agreements" but did not check the policy of diversification by other OSA countries. As the White Paper on the Basle Facility states -

"It therefore became obvious that it could no longer be assumed that even after the U.K. had achieved a surplus on its balance of payments that the sterling area countries would wish to hold as much sterling as previously. New means had therefore to be found to accommodate unavoidable reductions in the sterling balances and at the same time

to ensure that storling would be willingly held in reserves at levels not significantly below the present."

The Basic Facility

In early 1968 the Bank of England began discussions in Basle with representatives of the central banks which participated in the arrangements of June 1966 and with the Bank for International Settlements. Early in July this group indicated its willingness to provide credits amounting to U.S. \$2,000mm. to offset fluctuations in the sterling area balances. At the same time, the U.K. Government proposed to undertake consultations with the governments of the OSA countries and the offer made by the Basla group was subject to the satisfactory outcome of these consultations. The Basla countries were concerned that the facility should be amply sufficient to cover any prospective rundown of the sterling balances during the next three to five years and they were also anxious that the sterling area itself should make a contribution to the financing of the facility. On 9th September 1968, final agreement was reached between the U.K. and the Basla group.

The countries participating togother with the Bank for International Settlements were: Austria, Belgium, Conede, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Methorlands, Marway, Swedon, Switzerland and the United States. Under the facility, the United Kingdom is able to draw United States deliars or other foreign currencies from the BIS as and to the extent that the sterling balances of the OSA countries fall below an agreed starting level. The facility will be usable to meet falls in both official and private balances held by residents of the sterling area countries. It will not however, be available to finance any deficit in the U.K. balance of payments. The facility has a 10-year life, but drawings may be made during the first throo years. Amounts drawn under it will have to be repaid between the 6th and 10th years. The U.K. made a drawing on the facility towards the end of 1968.

In early July, negotiations between the U.K. Authorities and the OSA countries began regarding the terms of the undertaking. The U.K. proposed a uniform system and in addition proposed a charge for the Guarantee. It very soon became clear that simple uniformity could not be achieved and that the circumstances of each sterling area country had to be considered separately. In addition, the proposed charge for the Guarantee proved unacceptable and this

was withdrawn. Megotiation with some sterling area countries proved difficult and although the broad principles of the agreement were retained, there were areas of detail in which there was a good deal of bargaining. In the case of Australia, a provision was made whereby the net proceeds of official borrowings overseas in currencies other than in sterling a not sounted by part of total reserves for purposes of calculating the minimum sterling proportion until three months ofter the data of receipt.

The arrangement as finally agreed, involved an undertaling by the OSA countries to keep an agreed minimum proportion of their official reserves in sterling during the life of the agreements. The OSA countries were also urged to place some of their non-sterling holdings on deposit with the Bank for International Settlements in Basis. The U.K. on her part undertlok to maintain the U.S. dallar value of sligible official sterling reserves of the OSA countries should there be a further devaluation of sterling.

As the White Paper states -

"The Guarantee applies to that part of each country's official sterling reserves which exceeds 19 per cent of its total reserves; that is to say, 10 per cent of each country's total reserves will be held in the form of unguaranteed sterling. The Guarantee in terms of U.S. dollars means that in the event of any devaluation of sterling against the U.S. dollar, the U.K. would make a payment in sterling to each country to restore the dollar value of the gua guaranteed portion of its sterling reserves. The Guarantee does not extend to private holdings or to equities held in official reserves. The Guarantee is conditional on each country maintaining at all times a Minimum Sterling Proportion in its reserves...... Although sterling proportions vary from country to country, the arrangements, combined with the Guarantee arrangements mean that the storling area countries will hold 90 per cent of their reserves in the form of guaranteed sterling, non-sterling currencies or gold".

The agreements came into force on 25th September 1968 and will remain in force for 3 years with provision for extension to a further two years by mutual agreement.

In June 1968, the gross sterling balances of the OSA countries amounted to £2,796mm, and by the end of the year, these balances had increased to £2,869mm.

Uhat of the Future?

As indicated above, negotiation with some starling area countries proved difficult, Jamaica being a case in point. What the U.K. Authorities were asking in the beginning was that we should tie ourselves formally to sterling for a period of 7 years while at the same time, paying the U.K. a fee for guaranteeing our reserves. This was rather more than the Jamaican Authorities were prepared to accept. After consultation with other Caribbean /Monetary

Monetary Authorities and joint negotiation with the U.K. representatives, the proposals were varied as set out on pages 4-5.

Acceptance of the agreement has resulted in slowing down the process of diversifying our reserves. When our sterling reserves approach the agreed minimum, we have to convert some of our non-sterling holdings to restore a safe margin. As indicated on page 3, some 54 per cent of the Bank of Jamaica's reserves were held in sterling when the negotiations began and at the end of 1968, this proportion stood at 56 per cent.

At bottom however, so long as we desired to remain in the sterling area, we had no real choice. It was implied in the discussions that if we did not accept the proposals in principle, we might not be able to continue enjoying the benefits of sterling area membership. At that point in time there was no well thought out alternative to mombership in the sterling area. The agreements will expire in the period 1971-73 and w. will then have to consider whether it is more beneficial to us to remain in the sterling area, or to work out some alternative arrangement.

Research Department 8ANK OF JAMAICA March 1969.

U.K. EXTERNAL LIABILITIES AND CLAIMS IN STERLING

£3mn.

Overseas Sterling Countries

U.K. Liabilities

1000	<u>Total</u>	Australia, N.2. and S. Africa	India, Pakistan & Ceylon	Caribhean ' <u>Aree</u> *	East Central and Wast Africa	Middle Eäst+	fer East ^g	Others [©]	
<u>1967</u> Mar.	2,922	435	145	227	384	480	753	498	
วินกอ	2,841	454	122	247	365	407	748	498	
Sapt.	2,834	428	118	244	349	394	738	53 3	
Dec.	2,982	460	115	236	341	562	707	561	
<u>1968</u>									
Mar.	3,120	525	154	261	360	598	679	543	
June	2,796	516	150	257	349	413	617	494	
Sapt.	2,785	474	163	272	346	372	667	491	
Dac.	2,069	451	197	272	358	411	712	468	
b.K. C	laims								
1967									
Mar.	477	132	54	38	136	17	36	64	
J _{unc}	520	152	58	38	153	20	36	63	
Supt.	496	135	51	41	148	18	36	67	
Dac.	529	160	56	42	149	25	34	63	
1968									
lilar .	565	165	54	41	159	31	46	69	
June	613	212	54	45	150	30	55	67	
Sopt.	531	154	49	39	145	31	45	68	
Dac.	568	142	53	45	157	32	59	80	

^{*} Including Bahamas, Bormuda, British Honduras and Guyana.

Source: Bank of England Bulltein

⁺ Jurdan, Libya, Kuwait, Sautharn Yemen and other Persian Gulf Status.

[≠] Brunei, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapora.

[@] Cyprus, Iceland, the Republic of Irelano, Malta and British dependent territories not clsehwere included.

U.K. EXTERNAL LIABILITIES AND CLAIMS IN STERLING

£Jmn.

Mon-Starling Countries

U.X. Liabilities

	<u>Total</u>	North <u>America</u> *	Latin America+	Western Europa¢ EFTA EEC OTHER			Eastorn Middle Far Europo East East Othor				
<u>1967</u>											
flar.	1,298	156	39 .	357	255	76	44	180	153	38	
June	1,398	291	33	336	260	79	62	140	158	39	
Sept.	1,723	491	32	503	214	73	44	155	171	40	
Dac.	2,167	853	29	607	235	80	45	167	108	43	
1968											
Mar.	2,464	1,061	26	665	291	72	40	176	90	43	
June	2,280	886	26	670	285	69	40	159	99	46	
Sept.	2,486	1,067	31	755	244	70	46	144	87	42	
Dac.	2,700	1,250	28	874	224	71	39	102	7 6	44	
U.K. Claims											
1967											
ilor.	772	35	114	88	70	103	113	63	147	39	
วินกอ	804	33	128	99	63	112	111	65	154	39	
Sapt.	807	32	125	106	60	101	114	62	170	37	
Dec.	814	31	136	108	58	95	127	61	161	37	
1968											
ilar.	869	30	136	118	61	113	140	65	167	39	
Juna	966	31	139	131	74	116	160	82	195	38	
Sapt.	1,017	50	146	145	66	111	174	96	194	35	
0კc.	1,059	50	152	143	76	117	177	112	191	41	

<u>Mates</u>~

- * United States and dependencies, and Canada.
- + Other independent non-sterling countries of the American continent.
- g EFTA includes, with Switzerland, the B.I.S.: "other" comprises Andorra, Finland, Greece, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia.
- @ Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Soudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria and the Yemon.