Fiscal Rules: Towards a New Paradigm for Fiscal Sustainability in Small States

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Abstract
This study contends that Caribbean countries cannot adequately surmount their fiscal and debt challenges in the absence of binding rules that are geared towards entrenching fiscal discipline, curbing fiscal procyclicality, and improving budget transparency and credibility. Distilling global lessons and taking due cognizance of Caribbean countries’ idiosyncrasies, the paper proposes a broad framework for the design and implementation of fiscal rules. Results from simulations carried out to determine welfare effects and the extent of volatility of key macroeconomic variables under various fiscal rules scenarios, suggest that of the different types of simulated fiscal rules, expenditure rules perform the best in terms of reducing macroeconomic volatility, and in that regard, appear to be the most welfare enhancing. The findings of the study evince useful insights for policymakers on how to improve the design and conduct of fiscal policy for better fiscal, and by extension, development outcomes.

JEL Codes: E62, H60

Key Words: Fiscal rules, fiscal institutions, Caribbean
I. Introduction

The Caribbean has had a serious fiscal and debt problem for some time now. World Bank (2005), in analyzing fiscal performance in the 1990s notes, “in almost every Caribbean country, public sector debt is an issue, with public sector debt levels rising sharply since 1997 from already high levels” (p. 33). The Caribbean’s debt problem is a multi-causal one; Caribbean Development Bank (2013) provides a comprehensive exposition. Of the myriad causes of rising debt in the Caribbean, fiscal mismanagement, manifested by persistent deficits and unbridled growth in public expenditure, appears to be one of the most important.

The fiscal and debt challenge has become more acute, especially post 2008. Indeed, the global economic and financial crisis exacerbated the fiscal problem in the majority of Caribbean countries. The simple average of the countries’ overall deficit1 of 5.5 percent of GDP in 2009 was three times the average ratio in 2007. Consequently, public debt leaped to an average of 71.0 percent of GDP in 2009, six percentage points higher than the average ratio in 2007. Moreover, the pro-cyclical fiscal stance adopted by the majority of Caribbean countries because of limited/no fiscal space, meant that there was little or no cushion from the economic blow that the global crisis delivered. At end-2015, estimates for the ratios of public debt and fiscal deficit for the sample countries averaged 81.1 percent and 3.6 percent of GDP respectively.

Apart from the cyclical fiscal deterioration and the consequent damage to medium-term sustainability, the global crisis exposed fundamental fiscal-structural weaknesses. Entrenched institutional fragilities appeared to have aided and perpetuated fiscal pro-cyclicality; Mercer-Blackman and Seerattan (2014) and Samuel (2009) find empirical support for this. In addition to the pro-cyclicality problem, institutional shortcomings also tend to compromise budget credibility. Grenade (2015) points out that based on the findings of several Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) reports, in many countries, budget credibility and transparency in particular, tend to be lacking (as evidenced by the number of supplementaries that are presented to Parliament after Budget approval). Moreover, slippages in discretionary fiscal policy are particularly evident in the lead up to a general election.

Improving fiscal governance and strengthening institutions are imperative to not only curb fiscal pro-cyclicality and reduce indebtedness, but also to restore medium-term fiscal sustainability to better support socioeconomic development. This study argues for a new fiscal-structural culture, which of necessity, requires transformative shifts in fiscal practices, policies and institutions, ultimately for better fiscal, and by extension, development outcomes.

Against this backdrop, this study examines issues surrounding the applicability, design and adoption of fiscal rules for Caribbean countries as one transformative shift towards a new fiscal-structural culture. Indeed, the Caribbean’s fiscal performance, especially over the past two decades has drawn attention to the need to strengthen fiscal discipline, promote credibility and entrench counter-cyclical fiscal policy, through mechanisms such as fiscal rules. Given the persistence and scale of the fiscal and debt problem in many Caribbean countries, the urgent adoption of fiscal rules is viewed by the authors as a critical development priority for the Caribbean.

This study is therefore motivated by the urgent need for pragmatic, evidence-based solutions to promote a new structural-fiscal culture in the Caribbean; one where fiscal discipline in entrenched, fiscal pro-cyclicality is curbed if not totally replaced by counter-cyclical policies, and where transparency and

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1 The sample countries for this study are Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.

2 Refers to central government deficit.
credibility of budgets are fundamentally improved. There is a paucity of Caribbean research on these issues in general and fiscal rules in particular, and as such, this study addresses a crucial gap in the extant literature.

Fiscal rules refer to mechanisms that are enforced to constrain fiscal policy. Schaechter, Kinda, Budina, and Weber’s (2012) criteria for the qualification of a fiscal mechanism indicate that: fiscal rules must have numerical targets/ceiling/floor that are set on one or more government budgetary aggregates (expenditure, revenue, budget balance and/or public debt) and bound in legislation and fiscal arrangements (Kopits and Symansky 1998). The rules can be revised only on a low frequency basis and must be binding for at least three years (medium-term budgetary frameworks that can be changed annually are not considered).

From the outset, it is important to underscore that fiscal rules are not a panacea; indeed, they cannot guarantee fiscal sustainability, but they have become a popular mechanism by which to anchor fiscal policy, infuse fiscal discipline and promote credibility. Rules can reduce the likelihood of fiscal policy being subjected to misplaced, and sometimes, myopic plans of governments. The adoption of fiscal rules, particularly, but not exclusively by developing countries, has increased in recent years. According to Schaechter et al. (2012), the number of countries using one or more fiscal rules increased from five in 1990 to seventy-six in 2012.

While empirical results have been mixed with regards to the effectiveness of fiscal rules, two broad conclusions can be distilled from the literature: (1) the design and implementation of fiscal rules matter for their effectiveness; and (2) there is a positive correlation between the strength and extent of coverage of the fiscal rules and fiscal discipline, as measured by the overall fiscal balance (Ter-Minassian 2010 provides a useful discussion). Indeed, from the literature review, it appears that countries with strong fiscal discipline without rules do not need them; however, rules are needed in countries where fiscal discipline is a challenge.

Currently (as at March 2016), Jamaica and Grenada are the only ones of the twelve sample countries with legislated fiscal rules. Jamaica’s fiscal rules legislation was enacted on 21 March, 2014 and Grenada’s on January 1, 2016. Appendix A provides details of the fiscal rules for both countries. It is worth mentioning that five countries that are members of the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) - Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, operate with “de facto” rules, which have been recommended by the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB). The ECCB is the common monetary authority/central bank for the ECCU. However, the supranational rules are not legislated and are not enforced, they are viewed as indicative fiscal targets that ECCU member countries should strive to achieve. At the end of 2015, all five ECCU countries were in breach of the “de facto” rules. Grenada, which is a member of the ECCU, developed its own set of fiscal rules (modifying the “de facto” ECCB rules somewhat) when it entered into the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Extended Fund Facility program in June 2014.

The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Section two discusses some general fiscal-structural issues of Caribbean countries. Drawing on the discussion in section two, section three proposes an indicative framework for the design and implementation of fiscal rules for Caribbean countries that currently do not have legislated rules. For the two countries that do have legislated fiscal rules, it is much too early to assess their respective impacts on fiscal outcomes (this will be the focus of a follow-up study). In the absence of an impact assessment, section four carries out a simulation exercise in a heuristic attempt to assess the potential impacts of fiscal rules on selected macroeconomic variables as well as on consumer welfare. Section five discusses the results of the simulations and section six concludes.
II. Fiscal-Structural and Institutional Context: Snapshot

The causes and consequences of the Region’s fiscal and debt problem are subject matters that have received rapt attention both in the policy arena as well as in academia over time, but especially in recent times because in many countries, the problem has become more acute as Table 1 shows. For brevity however, this study does not provide a detailed trend analysis of fiscal performances of Caribbean countries, interested readers can consult various Article IV Assessments of the IMF for this. Instead, this study zeros in on a few key fiscal-structural and institutional issues that are perhaps less discussed in various fiscal expositions of Caribbean countries.

Table 1: Snapshot of Fiscal Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Overall Fiscal Balance (percent of GDP)</th>
<th>Gross Public Debt (percent of GDP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>-9.0</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCU^</td>
<td>-6.5</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>-8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook, April 2016.
Notes: ^ means simple average of the six countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

Persistent fiscal deficits and large public debt in the Region is partly a reflection of pro-cyclical fiscal policy, where governments spend excessively during booms and are forced to retrench during downturns. Indeed, the narrowing of the fiscal deficit ratios since 2010 in many of the countries is as a result of fiscal consolidation/ austerity undertaken amidst acute economic weaknesses. However, political and socioeconomic realities thwart large-scale fiscal consolidation in downturns, resulting in a ratchet effect in public debt (Grenade and Wright, 2013). Empirical evidence for the Caribbean suggests that multipliers are generally positive but quite low. Excluding Barbados and Guyana, Ruprah and Melgarejo’s (2013) results show that the fiscal multipliers are positive but weak (less than one); nevertheless they are statistically significant. Guy and Belgrave (2012) find that the cumulative multipliers are less than 0.3 after 24 quarters in a sample of Caribbean countries and they are negative in some. Fiscal multipliers of government consumption, government investment, and of tax revenue were estimated for the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU), the results suggest that only government investment multiplier is positive and less than one (0.60) (Gonzalez-Garcia, Lemus, and Mrkaic 2013).

The Region’s fiscal and debt problem also reflects institutional weaknesses relating to limited capacity for effectively managing public expenditure and matching this with revenues. In addition, systems for revenue and expenditure forecasting and debt management remain weak and ineffective in a number of countries, particularly as they relate to containing contingent liabilities. The PEFA Framework was established to improve benchmarking and monitoring of progress of national Public Financial

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3 The multiplier is the ratio of the rise in GDP relative to the size of the policy intervention (the reduction in taxes and/or increase in government purchases). A multiplier of one means that GDP increases by the size of the fiscal intervention.
Management (PFM) systems. The Framework identifies six critical dimensions of performance of an open and orderly PFM system and also assesses donor performance. The core dimensions are: credibility of the budget; comprehensiveness and transparency; policy-based budgeting; predictability and control in budget execution; accounting, recording and reporting; and external scrutiny and audit compliance issues. Deficiencies abound across all dimensions.

Fiscal decentralization in a number of the countries has exacerbated the sub-national PEFA governance challenges where implementation is inconsistent and capacity is weak at the sub-national level (United States Agency for International Development [USAID] 2014). Budgeting is a political process, and announcing that reforms are underway is far easier than actually carrying them out (Wescott 2009); thus budget planning is a major weakness across the region. Political considerations have at times undermined the impact of reform implementation (Department for International Development [DFID] 2014). Recording and reporting capabilities have affected the predictability of funds and commitment controls. PFM systems tend to lack a strong channel through which accountability can be ensured. Some countries lack robust PEFA plans and monitoring and evaluation frameworks that limit the scope to coerce accountability for results.

The Caribbean has been unable to link development strategies and plans to medium-term fiscal planning and current year appropriations and execution. There are also significant gaps in budget credibility, as several countries consistently execute budgets that differ significantly from approved budgets. Comprehensiveness and transparency are also problematic areas. Moreover, there exist challenges in procurement planning and execution, and poor linkages between budget preparation, procurement planning, and execution systems. Oversight and governance of procurement, weak monitoring of contract compliance, non-compliance with bidding processes by procurement agencies, and non-transparent bidding processes are additional areas where most countries face challenges.

III. Fiscal Rules for the Caribbean: Towards an Operational Framework

As discussed section two, the fiscal and debt problem has been engendered in part, by weak fiscal institutions and frameworks that have failed to curb, and in some cases, perpetuated fiscal indiscipline and chronic fiscal pro-cyclicality. To restore medium-to-long-term sustainability and credibility of fiscal policy, comprehensive reforms are required, particularly, but not exclusively, fiscal-structural reforms. Growth-enhancing reforms (not dealt with in this study) are needed also. This current study contends that given the strong political-economy roots of the Caribbean’s fiscal woes, if the Region is to truly surmount its acute fiscal and debt challenge, there must be a fundamental modification of the institutions that support the design and conduct of fiscal policy. Accordingly, fiscal rules must be an integral part of countries’ fiscal-structural reform agenda. The authors hold the view that a resolute commitment to fiscal rules will help to bolster confidence in countries’ fiscal policies and frameworks, with broader positive effects on sustainability and ultimately, economic growth and development.

A. Fiscal Rules: Guiding Principles

Before delving into an indicative operational framework for Caribbean countries (in section 3.2), it is useful to first examine some guiding principles that countries should consider in deciding whether or not to adopt fiscal rules. These include: (1) objective(s) of the rules; (2) type(s) of rules and coverage; (3) design issues; (4) implementation modalities; (5) institutional arrangements; and (6) timing. Each is dealt with in turn.

(i) Objectives
The ultimate objective of fiscal rules is to promote sustainable growth, while at the same time controlling deficits and limiting debt accumulation. However, as Anderson and Minarik (2006) point out, the ultimate objective is supported by at least two proximate ones: (1) long-term fiscal responsibility and sustainability; and (2) short-term macroeconomic stabilization. The authors caution that, “the apparent superiority of any rule on the basis of one criterion is not a sufficient justification for adoption” (p. 7).

Governments also implement fiscal rules to foster policy coordination between different levels of government, contribute to the reduction of uncertainty about future fiscal policy developments, control size of government, and promote cyclical stability. By extension, fiscal rules can foster economic stabilization, as they allow the fiscal accounts to adjust to variations in economic activity. Ambiguities in the objectives and definition can lead to ineffective enforcement; hence a fiscal rule and its objective should be clearly defined.

Fiscal rules are essential since unconstrained fiscal policy may be perceived as systematically deviating from desirable policies. In practice, pro-cyclical and/or unsustainable policies can be biased because of the political economy; that is, myopia, re-election concerns, fiscal illusion, distributive conflicts, and coordination failures. Strong rules can potentially inflict higher political costs. The effectiveness of a rule may be enhanced if it is enforced by a politically independent body (Inman 1996). The main argument is that fiscal rules are hard to modify or amend once they are enshrined in law or constitution and are characterized on a statutory basis.

In the context of Caribbean countries, a delicate balance must be struck between the short-term and long-term objectives in the creation of any fiscal rule(s). For the highly-indebted, fiscally-constrained and low-growth countries, the need for an economically-viable and politically-palatable balance between macroeconomic stabilization and debt restraint will be critically important.

(ii) Type and Coverage

The four main types of fiscal rules are debt rules, budget balance rules, expenditure rules and revenue rules (IMF 2009; Schaechter et al. 2012). The most frequently used rules are the budget balance rules and debt rules. Debt rules set a specific numerical target for public debt as a percentage of GDP. This rule is useful when monitoring and measuring economic performance are simple. Budget balance rules focus on an overall budget balance, structural or cyclically adjusted balances, or an average balance “over the cycle” of the economy. This rule helps in reducing the budget deficit and supports the convergence of the debt-to-GDP ratio to a desired level. This allows policy makers to identify and control the variable that has repeatedly contributed to debt. The expenditure rule limits total, primary and current spending. In general, this rule is applied to control the size of government. Revenue rules are aimed at boosting revenues or decreasing tax burdens by setting revenue ceilings or floors (Schaechter et al. 2012). The combination of rules adopted correlates with the fiscal challenges of an economy. Indeed, the types of rules depend on the variable(s) to be constrained, be it public debt, expenditure, overall balance, revenue, or a combination of those. IMF (2009) suggests that the variable to constrain should depend on the following factors: “(1) objective; (2) controllability and provision of clear operational guidelines for fiscal policy; and (3) transparency and ease of monitoring” (p. 20).

There are merits of each type of rule. Balanced budget/overall deficit rules can be advantageous since they can: (i) tighten asymptotic properties of debt; (ii) directly address the deficit bias; and (iii) can be simple and transparent. Debt rules are capable of directly tackling debt sustainability, can be transparent and simple, and can accommodate large shocks if debt is well below a defined ceiling. Revenue rules impose limits on revenues with a view to containing the size of the public sector /tax burden and allocate ex-ante revenue windfalls (e.g., due to surprisingly high growth). This rule is useful as it can reduce procyclicality in good times.
However, against these merits are demerits. Fiscal rules are opposed on two theoretical grounds: (1) automatic stabilizer can be hindered and (2) economic growth can be depressed. Automatic stabilizers are elements of the budget that tend to increase revenues during an expansion and increase expenditures during a recession. When automatic stabilizers are allowed to operate, the budget automatically generates surplus during an expansion and deficit during a recession. Thus, stabilization advocates argue that rules are not desirable since they can limit the decision-makers’ ability to adopt necessary stabilization policies during periods of exogenous shocks and thus hinder automatic stabilizers. The depressed-growth argument purports that volatility increases and by extension, growth is dampened because automatic stabilizers are not allowed to kick in automatically (Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1998; and Levinson, 1998).

A poorly-designed rule can be more harmful than helpful. Rules can suffer from a number of weaknesses, namely, balanced budget and overall deficit limits could force cuts in investment. These may also accommodate manipulations, and do not guarantee debt sustainability. In addition, they are procyclical, unless cyclically adjusted. Moreover, debt and revenue rules can induce revenue pro-cyclicity due to the progressivity of tax systems. Debt rules may lead to undesirable responses to interest rate and exchange rate shocks, if debt is close to its prudential limit. Drawbacks with individual rules have led most countries to adopt combination of rules.

The coverage of fiscal rules may vary significantly. Coverage speaks to whether the rules take into consideration central government or the entire public sector. At a minimum, rules must cover central government. However, to prevent the accumulation of debt, it is critical that the fiscal framework guiding the central government involves a cohesive mechanism that controls all sources of indebtedness, which must include the wider public sector. Narrow coverage, including not covering quasi-fiscal activities through institutions beyond the general government, such as public nonfinancial and financial enterprises, can render a fiscal rule(s) unsuccessful because they can provide room/ incentives to shift operations to areas of the budget not covered by the rules or directly off budget.

Based on the four main types of rules, the one(s) that might be most suitable to individual Caribbean countries should be guided by the considerations articulated by IMF (2009) as well as country idiosyncrasies. Deciding on the most apt rule will require not only perspective and judgment, but importantly, due cognizance of the political-economy realities in country. In the final analysis, the choice of a fiscal rule must meet its primary and proximate objectives and must be able to withstand harsh political and economic situations.

(iii) Design Issues

The economic, political and institutional peculiarities of a country are integral to the design of any fiscal rule. While there is no “one-size-fits-all” approach, there are some broad principles that should guide the design of fiscal rules. Primarily, these include simplicity and transparency, credibility, and flexibility. With respect to simplicity, the variable(s) being constrained must be a fiscal indicator that is clearly-defined, uncomplicated, and difficult to manipulate. Additionally, the variables(s) must be easy to monitor and control, especially during budget implementation. Simplicity and transparency go hand-in-hand. In relation to transparency, Balasonne and Franco (2002) recognize that transparency is helpful for the success of fiscal policy, whether it be rules-based or discretionary. Specifically related to fiscal rules, it is important that they are designed and implemented in an unambiguous manner, and must be well explained and communicated to the public. Transparency is also important to enhance the integrity of the budget process by limiting quasi-fiscal activities. Additionally, the institutional structures and functions supporting a fiscal rule must be explicit. Transparency in fiscal reporting is also important.

Regarding credibility, Anderson and Minarik (2006) are adamant that, “no fiscal rule can add to credibility if it is flouted” (p. 180). Indeed, a credible fiscal rule is one that makes it arduous and/or costly (politically and otherwise) to make ad hoc and frequent changes. Rules must also be perceived as
credible by financial markets and the public at large so as to bolster confidence in fiscal policy decisions and underpinning institutions and frameworks. However, rules ought not to be too rigid, rendering them unworkable. There must be a feasible balance between credibility and flexibility.

Pertaining to flexibility, it is particularly important in fixed exchange rate economies where fiscal policy is the only macroeconomic stabilization tool. Regardless of the exchange rate regime however, fiscal rules should be designed with sufficient built-in flexibility so that fiscal policy can adequately respond to economic and other shocks, without undermining the discipline and sustainability benefits of the rule(s). According to Schaechter et al. (2012), fiscal rule should be designed with appropriate escape clauses that include:

“(1) a very limited range of factors that allow such escape clauses to be triggered in legislation; (2) clear guidelines on the interpretation and determination of events (including voting rules); and (3) specification on the path back to the rule and treatment of accumulated deviations” (p. 20).

Schaechter et al. (2012) observe that twelve countries globally, as well as countries in the EURO and West African Monetary areas use fiscal rules with embedded escape clauses. Typically, escape clauses apply in the event of: (1) natural disasters, (2) economic recession, (3) banking system bailouts; (4) change in government; (5) change in budget coverage; and (6) other events outside of governments’ control. Importantly, the magnitude of the shock(s) that would give effect to an escape clause must be unequivocal. Ultimately, the decision of if, and when to relax a fiscal rule in the presence of a shock, is a country-specific one.

(iv) Implementation Modalities

The credibility of the rule and governments’ commitment to the rule are likely to be enhanced if there is a high degree of certainty that non-compliance would be sanctioned. Mechanisms for enforcement must be an integral part of the design of any fiscal rule. Ter-Minassian (2010) emphasizes that enforcement mechanisms must have a solid legal basis and discourage non-compliance through unambiguous and sufficiently potent sanctions. With respect to a legal basis, Ter-Minassian (2010), while pointing out that it is not necessarily a precondition for the introduction of a fiscal rule, duly acknowledges that its sustainability and credibility prospects are greatly enhanced with a strong legal foundation. In relation to enforcement mechanisms, their success is likely to be heightened if they are underpinned by explicit requirements to correct aberrations from the rule within a reasonable, pre-specified time period. Ter-Minassian (2010) suggests that sanctions should be realistic enough to make application doable. Based on the survey of the literature, typically, sanctions are either financial (fees and fines for example) or administrative (submission of a plan to correct deficit, for example). However, there are two factors that condition the usefulness/effectiveness of sanctions; first, they require a third-party enforcer, who may or may not be effective; and second, full enforcement may lead to political instability. For these reasons IMF (2009) opines that sanctions are hardly ever envisaged, and advocates that formal enforcement procedures should rely on mechanisms that encourage an obligation to (1) take corrective measures and/or (2) minimize cost of non-compliance. IMF (2009) asserts that, “the mere introduction of fiscal rules does not guarantee success, unless the cost of breaking the rule is higher than the benefit of doing so” (p. 34).

(v) Institutional Arrangements

There is general agreement in the literature that fiscal rules must be embedded in strong institutional arrangements. Lane (2003) in particular stresses the importance of the efficacy of governments’ machinery, and insists that fiscal policies must be used in conjunction with improvements in government efficiency. Bergan and Hutchinson (2014) find empirical support for moderate-to-high government efficiency in aiding the effectiveness of fiscal rules in reducing the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy in developing countries. IMF (2009) calls for adequate PFM systems and views them as prerequisites for
effective implementation of fiscal rules. Indeed, IMF (2009) argues that PFM systems should be so effective that they allow for a smooth and easy conversion of the intent of the fiscal rule into the reality of budget policy and implementation. Of the PFM systems, sound accounting systems that are consistent across all government ministries are particularly important for Ter-Minassian (2010) to ensure timely monitoring of the fiscal targets included in a country’s fiscal rules.

Monitoring is indeed crucial and increasingly several countries (particularly, but not exclusively in advanced and emerging-market) are using “fiscal watch dogs” such as an independent fiscal council to monitor and assess the implementation and impacts of fiscal policy. From a survey of the literature, fiscal councils perform three main functions: (i) fiscal analysis (which should be objective) and costing of proposed budgetary measures; (2) independent fiscal forecasts and broader macroeconomic projections; and (3) assessments of the appropriateness of the fiscal stance. In some countries, fiscal councils are also responsible for publicizing non-observance of rules.

In countries that have fiscal rules, their credibility is further bolstered because of the oversight provided by such independent bodies. Wyplosz (2011), in a systematic evaluation of fiscal councils worldwide, remarks, “a fair conclusion is that advisory fiscal policy councils have made a tangible contribution to fiscal discipline in countries where policymakers have shown a willingness to listen to them” (p 11). Wyplosz (2011) contends that after fiscal rules, a fiscal council is the second best solution for promoting fiscal discipline and sustainable public finances. Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011) advance the point that fiscal councils are not alternatives to fiscal rules but are complementary and suggest that the design of fiscal rules should be considered jointly with the design of fiscal councils. Indeed, international organizations such like the IMF, OECD and European Commission have also advocated complementarity and cohesion.

Off course, the actual setup of a fiscal council must be country specific, taking into account the nature/magnitude of the fiscal and debt challenge as well as the political context. It is noteworthy however, that fiscal councils are not a panacea. Indeed, based on a survey of fiscal councils worldwide, it appears that there is little political cost for a government that ignores the advice of fiscal councils (Wyplosz 2011). Though useful, there are inherent limitations of fiscal councils; as such, it is important that fiscal rules be embedded in law in particular, a fiscal responsibility law (FRL).

Leinert (2010) defines a FRL as “a limited-scope law that elaborates on the rules and procedures relating to three budget principles: accountability, transparency and stability” (p. 5). The author outlines the following requirements as core components of a FRL:

“(1) specification of the medium-term path of fiscal aggregates;
(2) description of the medium-term and annual budget strategy for attaining the chosen fiscal objectives;
(3) regular publication of reports (at least twice a year) on the attainment of fiscal objectives or targets; and
(4) audited annual financial statements that assure the integrity of fiscal information” (p. 5).

However, Leinert (2010) points out that those are not exhaustive, and in practice, FRLs usually contain discretionary features. Fiscal rules embedded in a FRL-type legislation have become popular in recent years, especially in emerging-market economies. According to Schaechter et al. (2012), 14 emerging economies had FRLs in 2011, compared with four in 2000 and zero in 1985. Reasons for adopting a FRL vary depending on country context; however, two reasons appear common: accountability and responsibility.
In the Caribbean context, given the political roots of the fiscal and debt problem, rules must be binding, enshrined in law, and effectively enforced.

**(vi) Timing**

Depending on the objective(s) of the fiscal rule, it can either be introduced: (1) at the start of a fiscal consolidation program; (2) to lock in gains from a fiscal consolidation program; (3) during a period of economic upturn; and (4) during an economic recession, i and iv are consistent with the stabilization objective, while ii and iii accord with the sustainability objective. IMF (2009) presents empirical evidence, which suggests that fiscal rules are more likely to be adopted by countries in which a fiscal consolidation program is ongoing, rather than in countries just starting a program. The study’s findings support the view that prior consolidation enhances the credibility of fiscal rules. Further, the evidence also implies that fiscal rules are more likely to be introduced during times of economic stability rather than during periods of economic declines, large external imbalances and sharp currency depreciations. In the final analysis however, whatever the appropriate timing might be, public consultations prior to design of rule is important. Public consultations would be critically important given the political-economy context of Caribbean countries.

Lessons from country experiences suggest that fiscal rules matter. Fiscal policy without rules can lead to a short-sighted, asymmetric policy under which the level of debt increases over business cycles, until it becomes unsustainable. Second, any target must be backed up by institutions. In particular, forecasts need to be made by independent agents. Third, rules must be accompanied by political commitment to long-term fiscal sustainability.

**B. An Indicative Operational Framework for Caribbean Countries**

Table 2 lays out an indicative operational framework for Caribbean countries that do not have legislated fiscal rules. Fiscal rules are proposed based on the fiscal, context of each country as highlighted in Table 1. In general however, the proposed rules are all geared towards entrenching discipline, curbing procyclicality, enforcing counter-cyclical policies, and improving budget transparency and credibility, which considered an urgent development priority for all countries.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Proposed Indicative Framework To Improve Discipline And Sustainability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Type of Fiscal Rule</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| The Bahamas | Spending rule. | • Increases in total expenditure not exceed medium-term nominal GDP growth projections. | • Medium-term budget framework that is binding.  
• Stronger expenditure monitoring mechanisms.  
• Enforceable multi-annual expenditure ceilings across the public sector.  
• Fiscal Responsibility Law.  
• Fiscal council/ “fiscal watch dog.” | • Rules enshrined in law.  
• Formal mechanism (public disclosure of any breaches).  
• Natural disasters.  
• Economic recession.  
• Financial sector bailout. |
|            | Spending rule. | • Increases in total expenditure not exceed nominal GDP growth or at most, remain constant when nominal growth is negative.  
• Total annual expenditure not exceed 33 percent of GDP for a legislated period. | • Medium-term budget framework that is binding.  
• Stronger expenditure monitoring mechanisms.  
• Enforceable multi-annual expenditure ceilings across the public sector.  
• Fiscal Responsibility Law. | • Rules enshrined in law.  
• Formal mechanism (public disclosure of breaches).  
• Natural disasters.  
• Economic recession.  
• Financial sector bailout. |
<p>|            | Debt rule. | • New borrowing should only be to finance public investment until public debt falls below 100 percent of GDP. | • Fiscal Responsibility Law. | |
|---------|----------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Belize  | • Spending rule. | • Total annual expenditure not exceed 25 percent of GDP for a legislated period. | • Increases in total debt stock not exceed 2-year projected nominal GDP growth. | • Medium-term budget framework that is binding. | • Stronger expenditure monitoring mechanisms. | • Enforceable multi-annual expenditure ceilings across the public sector. | • Fiscal Responsibility Law. | • Rules enshrined in law. | • Natural disasters. | • Economic recession. | • Financial sector bailout. |
|         | • Debt rule.    | • Increases in total debt stock not exceed 2-year projected nominal GDP growth over the medium term. | • New borrowing should only be to finance public investment until public debt falls below 60 percent of GDP. | • Fiscal Responsibility Law. | • Fiscal council/ “fiscal watch dog.” | • Rules enshrined in law. | • Natural disasters. | • Economic recession. | • Financial sector bailout. |
| Guyana  | • Spending rule. | • Total annual expenditure not exceed 30 percent of GDP over the medium term. | • Increases in total debt stock not exceed 2-year projected nominal GDP growth over the medium term. | • Medium-term budget framework that is binding. | • Stronger expenditure monitoring mechanisms. | • Enforceable multi-annual expenditure ceilings across the public sector. | • Fiscal Responsibility Law. | • Rules enshrined in law. | • Economic recession. | • Financial sector bailout. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Spending rule.</th>
<th>Fiscal council/“fiscal watch dog.”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECCU: [Antigua &amp; Barbuda, Dominica, St. Kitts &amp; Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent &amp; the Grenadines]</td>
<td>• Deficit rule.</td>
<td>• Overall balance not exceed 3 percent of GDP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Debt rule.</td>
<td>• Debt-to-GDP ratio of 60 percent by 2030.</td>
<td>• Stronger expenditure monitoring mechanisms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Enforceable multi-annual expenditure ceilings across the public sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Fiscal Responsibility Law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Fiscal council/ “fiscal watch dog.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Formalize the current debt and deficit rules in legislation and establish an enforcement mechanism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Natural disasters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Economic recession.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Financial sector bailout.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ conceptualization.
IV. Simulating the Impacts of Fiscal Rules

A simulation exercise is undertaken in the absence of a formal assessment of the impact of fiscal rules on actual fiscal outcomes. It is too early to undertake such an assessment given that the fiscal rules were legislated in March 2014 and January 2016 for Jamaica and Grenada respectively. A small open economy real business cycle (RBC) model, derived from the works of Bi, Wenyi, and Shu-Chun (2014), Wright and Ramirez (2014), and Ovalle and Ramirez (2014), is used to carry out the simulation exercise. The objectives of the model are twofold: (i) to determine welfare effects from simulated fiscal rules; and (ii) to assess the extent of volatility of key macroeconomic variables under various fiscal rules scenarios. The model uses three types of fiscal rules (revenue, expenditure and the overall fiscal balance). Simulated fiscal rules allow the fiscal authority to determine limits for the debt-to-GDP ratio, while making changes to revenue or expenditure or the overall fiscal balance separately, as well as simultaneously.

A. Determining Welfare Effects

Lucas’ (1987) methodology is used to determine the welfare effects (changes in households’ consumption) of specified simulated fiscal rules relative to a discretional fiscal policy\footnote{Defined by Gonzalez-Garcia, Lemus, and Mrkaic (2013) as the difference between actual government activities less a “no-policy change” scenario, which is the previous year’s fiscal balance adjusted by inflation.}. The methodology estimates the reductions in average consumption householders are willing to accept and still remain indifferent among the various fiscal rules. The formula for estimating welfare utility, based on compensating consumption is:

\[ \eta = (1 - \beta) \eta + \beta \eta \]

Where the discount factor represented by $\beta$, determines consumption at its steady state, which allows householders to experience indifference in terms of expected utility across the different fiscal rules relative to the discretional policy rule. Determining the change in steady-state consumption by using second order approximations, welfare gains and compensating variations are calculated to compare each fiscal rule to the discretional policy rule following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), Gonzalez-Garcia, Lemus, and Mrkaic (2013) and Kumhof and Laxton (2013).

B. Assessing Macroeconomic Volatility

Following a similar exercise by Ovalle and Ramirez (2014), the volatility of selected macroeconomic variables (output, consumption, investment and employment) under each simulated fiscal rule is compared against the discretionary fiscal policy across the nine economies studied (The Bahamas, Belize, Barbados, and the six economies comprising the ECCU)\footnote{These countries were included because of data availability and consistency.}. The very nature of these small very open economies generally portend acute vulnerability to shocks, such as terms of trade and productivity shocks. Prevalence of these shocks contributes to increasing volatility of key macroeconomic variables that could adversely affect confidence in governments’ fiscal policy and overall consumer welfare.

The model consists of three sectors; government, households and firms.

Government sector

Standard fiscal variables are derived as follows; income taxes $\tau^t$, from labour and capital, consumption taxes, $\tau^c$ and the deficit, $b^t$, financed by bonds. Transfers are granted to householders $z_t$ and the real
sector comprises of both the tradable and non-tradable goods \((g^T_t)\) and \((g^N_t)\) respectively. The goods basket incorporates goods at a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregator. The price of government goods is outlined as follows:

\[
p_t^g = [\varphi^g (p_t^N)^{1-x} + (1 - \varphi^g)(s_t)^{1-x}]^{\frac{1}{1-x}}
\]

(2)

Where \(\varphi^g\) is the level of home bias (the proportion of goods consumed from domestic production relative to imported goods), \(x\) is the rate of substitution between goods, \(s_t\) is the rate of exchange, and \(p_t^N\) is the non-tradable goods price.

The deficit position is described by:

\[
\tau_t c_t + \tau_t^2 (w_t l_t + r^N_t k^N_{t-1} + r^T_t k^T_{t-1}) - (s_t b_{t-1} - p_t^g g_t - z_t) = q_t s_t b_t^* \tag{3}
\]

Where \(q_t\) is the foreign bond price and \(q_t s_t b_t^*\) (fiscal deficit) is the amount that will be financed by selling bonds \(b_t^*\), \(w\) is wages, \(l\) is leisure, \(r\) is interest rate, \(k\) is capital, and \(N\) and \(T\) are the non-traded and traded sectors respectively.

Movement in the fiscal deficit is based on rules targeting debt and rules related to revenue and expenditure. Changes in revenue, spending, and overall balance determine targeted limits for the debt-to-GDP ratio \((\frac{b}{y})\) as follows:

**Targeted debt ratio with Revenue Rule**

\[
\tau_t = \alpha_0 \tau_{t-1} + \alpha_1 \left(\frac{b_t^*}{y_t} - b^*\right), \quad y \quad \alpha_0 > 0, \alpha_1 > 0 \tag{4}
\]

**Targeted debt ratio with Expenditure Rule**

\[
g_t = \alpha_0 g_{t-1} + \alpha_1 \left(\frac{b_t^*}{y_t} - b^*\right), \quad y \quad \alpha_0 > 0, \alpha_1 < 0 \tag{5}
\]

**Targeted debt ratio with Overall Balance Rule**

\[
bp_t = \alpha_0 bp_{t-1} + \alpha_1 \left(\frac{b_t^*}{y_t} - b^*\right), \quad y \quad \alpha_0 > 0, \alpha_1 > 0 \tag{6}
\]

Where \(\alpha_0\) is the policy instrument and \(\alpha_1\) is the degree of adjustment between targeted debt-to-GDP ratio and the actual when different rules are applied. Simulated fiscal rules allow the fiscal authority to determine limits for the debt-to-GDP ratio, while making changes to revenue or expenditure or the overall fiscal balance separately, as well as simultaneously.

With no limits for the debt-to-GDP ratio and the level of government spending, the revenue rule establishes a minimum level for revenue, hence limiting the tax- to-GDP ratio. \(\tau^*\):

\[
\tau_t = \tau^* \tag{7}
\]

With limits set for government spending, but no limits for the debt-to-GDP ratio and revenue, the government spending-to-GDP ratio is set at an upper limit:

\[
\frac{b_t}{y_t} = \frac{g^*}{y} \tag{8}
\]

The overall balance rule is determined assuming constraints on the overall balance-to-GDP ratio, and no constraints on revenues, expenditure, and debt:

\[
\frac{bp_t}{y_t} = \left(\frac{bp}{y}\right)^* \tag{9}
\]
Compared against these simulated rules is the discrentional rule \((d_t)\), which shows government spending and revenue beyond and above the existing fiscal policy stance (Atiñas and Klemm 2014). The discrentional rule is defined as the difference between actual government activities less a “no-policy change” scenario, which is the previous year’s fiscal balance adjusted by inflation:

\[
d_t = g_t - g_{t-1}(1 + \pi_t)
\]

(10)

The automatic mechanism of correction that rectifies deviations from targeted levels is normalized, which is a usual practice in fiscal management.

**Households**

The household basket of goods comprises property, leisure and consumption \(\tilde{c}_t\) and \((1 - l_t)\) following a CES index:

\[
\tilde{c}_t = \left[\omega(c_t)^{\frac{v-1}{v}} + (1 - \omega)(g_t)^{\frac{v-1}{v}}\right]^{\frac{v}{v-1}}
\]

(11)

Where \(\omega\) is the share of private consumption bias (portion of private goods consumed relative to public goods) and \(v\) relates to the level of interchangeability between the three types of goods. The determined utility function for preferences is as follows:

\[
U_t = \left(\log(\tilde{c}_t) + \phi \frac{(1 - l_t)^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}\right)
\]

(12)

\(\sigma\) is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity\(^6\) of labor and \(\phi\) is the share of leisure in the function.

Household maximizes utility over the horizon; \(E_t \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U_t; \beta \in (0,1)\), where \(\beta\) is the discount factor, helping to determine the paths for goods, labour, investment and capital throughout the sectors:

\[
(1 + \tau_t^c) c_t + i_t^N + i_t^T + \frac{\kappa}{2} \left(\frac{l_t^N}{k_t^{N-1}} - \delta\right)^2 k_t^{N-1} + \frac{\kappa}{2} \left(\frac{l_t^T}{k_t^{T-1}} - \delta\right)^2 k_t^{T-1} = (1 - \tau_t^l)(w_t l_t + r_t^N k_t^{N-1} + r_t^T k_t^{T-1}) + Z_t
\]

(13)

Where the parameter \(\kappa\) is the adjustment costs of capital and the rate of depreciation is \(\delta\). The first order conditions (FOC) for the equilibrium relationship among householders is outlined as follows:

\[
\phi(1 - l_t)^{-\sigma} = (1 + \tau_t^c)(1 - \tau_t^l) w_t \omega c_t^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \tilde{c}_t^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}
\]

(14)

**Firms**

Following a Cobb-Douglas function, firms produce for the tradable and non-tradable sectors in perfect competition as follows:

\[
y_t^N = a_t (k_t^N)^{1-a^N} (l_t^N)^{a^N}
\]

(15)

\[
y_t^T = a_t (k_t^T)^{1-a^T} (l_t^T)^{a^T}
\]

(16)

---

\(\text{6 captures the substitution effect of a change in the wage rate on labor supply.}\)
\[
\ln \frac{\alpha_t}{\alpha} = \rho_\alpha \ln \frac{\alpha_{t-1}}{\alpha} + \varepsilon^\alpha_t; \varepsilon^\alpha_t \sim N(0, \sigma^2_{\alpha})
\]

(17)

\(\alpha_t\) is the total factor of production that follows the AR (1) process and \(\varepsilon^\alpha_t\) is a productivity shock in both sectors.

The FOC helps determine labour and capital demand and a shock to terms of trade follows an exogenous process:

\[
l_t^N = \alpha^N \left( \frac{p_t^N}{w_t^N} \right) y_t^N
\]

(18)

\[
l_t^T = \alpha^T \left( \frac{\xi_t^s}{w_t^T} \right) y_t^T
\]

(19)

\[
k_{t-1}^N = (1 - \alpha^N) \left( \frac{p_{t-1}^N}{y_t^N} \right) y_t^N
\]

(20)

\[
k_{t-1}^T = (1 - \alpha^T) \left( \frac{\xi_t^s}{y_t^T} \right) y_t^T
\]

(21)

\(\xi_t = \frac{p_t}{s_t}\) is the terms of trade that follows an exogenous process:

\[
\ln \frac{\xi_t}{\xi} = \rho_\xi \ln \frac{\xi_{t-1}}{\xi} + \varepsilon^\xi_t; \varepsilon^\xi_t \sim N(0, \sigma^2_{\xi})
\]

(22)

Appendix B provides further details on the model’s calibration and parameters used.

IV. Results

Results, presented in Appendix C for The Bahamas, Belize, Barbados and the ECCU, show the impact on consumer welfare (gains/losses), based on the gap between the simulated fiscal rules and the prevailing discretionary fiscal policy. Expenditure rules, which simulate adjustments in public spending based on deviations from the targeted debt-to-GDP ratio, provide a higher rate of consumer welfare in The Bahamas (0.18 difference), relative to the discretionary fiscal policy rule than any other rules. This result is similar for all the economies studied with Belize (0.38 difference), Barbados (0.13 difference) and the combined ECCU economies (0.47 difference). For Belize and the ECCU, the expenditure rule without adjustments in the targeted debt-to-GDP ratio, was considered the next best fiscal rule for improving welfare relative to the discretionary policy. In The Bahamas and Barbados, a revenue rule (which simulate adjustments in revenue based on deviations from the targeted debt-to-GDP ratio) was considered the second best rule for improving welfare.

The classifications of the simulated fiscal rules in Appendix C are: DR1, which shows adjustments being made to revenue once there is a deviation from the targeted debt-to-GDP ratio; DR2, is similar to DR1, but adjustments are made to government spending based on deviations from the targeted debt-to-GDP ratio; DR3 shows adjustments in the overall balance against deviations from the targeted debt ratio, RBF, RG and RI all rules for the overall balance, expenditure and revenue as proportions of GDP respectively, with no limits to the debt-to-GDP ratio.

Results in Appendices D to G pertaining to the volatility of selected macroeconomic variables show that rules based on simulations without a targeted debt-to-GDP ratio tend to increase macroeconomic volatility. This result is also observed by Ovalle and Ramirez (2014) and could be suggestive of a lack of credible consistency of government policies. However, simulated revenue rules, without adjustments in expenditure tend to have the overall lowest volatility across the economies studied. In the first two
economies studied (Bahamas and Belize), this rule had the near lowest volatility in consumption, investment and employment, with similar results for Barbados and the ECCU countries.

A key policy implication of the simulated results is that going forward, the design and conduct of fiscal policy should be modified to include appropriate fiscal rules to reduce macroeconomic volatility and enhance welfare. The flexibility of the rules must take into account the cyclical nature of the economy. To ensure cyclical neutrality, fiscal rules must allow for the efficient functioning of automatic stabilizers. The design of fiscal rules largely depends on governments’ macroeconomic objectives and priorities. The policy dilemma that policymakers face is ensuring that the most effective enforcement mechanisms are implemented.

V. Conclusion

This study examined issues surrounding the applicability, design and adoption of fiscal rules for twelve Caribbean countries as one transformative shift towards promoting a new fiscal-structural culture. In analyzing the Caribbean’s fiscal-structural context, the study argued that Caribbean countries cannot adequately surmount their fiscal and debt challenges in the absence of an institutionalized and legitimate discretionary-constraining mechanism, such as fiscal rules. The study therefore proposes an indicative framework for the design and implementation of fiscal rules, based on specific country nuances. The implementation of fiscal rules, which are idiosyncratic given varying contexts, but which are all are geared towards entrenching discipline, curbing pro-cyclicality, enforcing counter-cyclical policies, and improving budget transparency and credibility, are considered an urgent development priority. Simulations carried out to assess consumer welfare and macroeconomic volatility under various fiscal rules-scenarios, found that of the different types of fiscal rules, simulated expenditure rules perform best in terms of reducing macroeconomic volatility, and in that regard, appear to be the most welfare enhancing. The results suggest that the attainment of crucial economic targets depend on governments’ ability to design and manage binding rules to guide an effective fiscal framework. This requires assessment of the country’s major fiscal challenges and institutional frameworks. The process must be subject to continuous monitoring preferably by an independent authority. The findings of the study evince useful insights for policymakers on how the design and conduct of fiscal policy might be improved for better fiscal, and by extension, development outcomes.
### Appendix A: Fiscal Rules in Jamaica and Grenada

**Jamaica:** In 2010, Jamaica entered into an EFF program with the IMF. Persistent fiscal deficits increased the country’s dependence on debt, causing the debt-to-GDP ratio to reach over 140 percent in 2010 (Central Bank of Jamaica, 2013). The IMF program was short-lived, and in 2013, Jamaica once again requested an EFF from the IMF. In response to Jamaica’s request for an EFF, the IMF imposed as a major conditionality—design of a fiscal rule by August 31, 2013—to be incorporated as a part of the 2014/2015 budget. The Jamaican Government’s request for a four-year extended loan facility from the IMF was approved in August 2013. In March 2014, Jamaica took aggressive steps to improve its fiscal framework and meet its target by enacting a legislation to enable the adoption of the fiscal rules. Jamaica’s fiscal responsibility framework as articulated in Financial Accountability (Amendment) Act, 2014 and the Public Bodies Management and Accountability (Amendment) Act, 2014 include a balanced budget rule and a debt rule. The framework’s prime objective is to limit the annual fiscal deficit of the public sector (covering all fiscal activities), to achieve a reduction in public debt to no more than 60 percent of GDP by 2025/2026. The rule establishes an automatic correction mechanism that would be triggered by substantial cumulative deviations from annual balance target. The fiscal responsibility framework allows for an escape clause to be effected with parliamentary approval, allowing for the suspension of the fiscal rules for a specified period in the event of major adverse shocks, such as natural disasters, severe economic contraction, public emergency, or a financial sector crisis. The fiscal rules take into account all fiscal activities associated with the public sector as well as fiscal implication of public private partnerships therefore accounting for contingent fiscal liabilities and risk. Rules are enforced in law, but there is no independent monitoring. The framework also does not propose sanctions for breaches of the fiscal rules.

**Grenada:** The fiscal responsibility framework as articulated in its Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2016 (FRA), has four main objectives: (a) transparency in fiscal and financial affairs; (b) full and timely disclosure and wide publication of financial transactions and decisions; (c) reduction of public debt to a prudent and sustainable level; and (d) risk monitoring and management. The FRA includes a primary balance rule and a debt rule; specifically, a primary surplus of 3.5 percent of GDP and a debt-to-GDP ratio of 60 percent (policy target) and 55 percent of GDP (operational target). The fiscal operations of the public sector are to be consistent with maintaining public debt on a sustainable path towards its policy target; for example, by maintaining primary expenditure growth at 2 percent adjusted for inflation; capping the growth of the wage bill by 2 percent adjusted for inflation; and keeping wage negotiations current. The FRA allows for the suspension of the fiscal rules in the case of natural disasters, severe economic contractions, and financial crisis. A 3-year period is allowed for corrective actions. The FRA also allows for the monitoring and reporting to Parliament on compliance with the rules and targets.
Appendix B: Model Parameters and Moments

Calibration

The calibrated parameters used in the model, comprise of parameters that are common across the economies studied and country-specific parameters. The moments of the detrended data for the period are matched with the coefficients of autocorrelations and standard deviations of the model, to ensure the consistency of the data within the model. The determination of both parameters is based on information garnered from similar studies (Bi et al., 2014; and Wright and Ramirez 2014) on small open economies. Parameters calculated or estimated by the authors are from data series derived from statistical databases from the Central Banks of Barbados, Belize and Bahamas, the IMF International Finance Statistical Database and the Economic Commission of Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Table A1 comprises of the common parameters, while Tables A2 and A3 contain the country-specific parameters.

Table A1: Common Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\varphi$ Weight of non-tradable in consumption basket</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma$ Inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\upsilon$ Elasticity of substitution between $c_t$ and $g_t$</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega$ Weight of $c_t$ in effective consumption</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi$ Elasticity of substitution between tradables and non-tradables $c_t$ and $g_t$</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^l$ Elasticity of substitution between $l^N_t$ and $l^T_t$ in $l$</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varphi^l$ Steady state labour income share of the non-tradable sector</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\kappa$ Investment adjustment costs</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha^N$ Weight of labour income in non-tradable sector</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha^T$ Weight of labour income in tradable sector</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi$ Steady state of leisure participation</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta$ Annual rate of depreciation</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The proportion of non-tradable share in the consumption basket ($\varphi$) is set to 0.5, which is close to estimates in previous studies (Bi et al., 2014), for example, 0.49 for the Dominican Republic (Wright and Ramirez, 2014). Following Bi et al. (2014) and Wright and Ramirez (2014), and estimated parameters for similar small open economies, $\sigma$, the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of supply, is estimated at 2, the substitution elasticity in the household basket ($\upsilon$) is calibrated at 0.49 and $\omega$, the weight of consumption preference $c_t$ in effective consumption is made at 0.8, while the level of substitution on tradable versus non-tradable is estimated at 0.44. The labour mobility $\chi^l$, is equal to 1, the steady share of labour income in the non-tradable sector $\varphi^l$, is calibrated to 0.5. Costs of investment adjustment parameter are done at 1.7. Assuming that sectors have about the same labour intensiveness, the similar parameters for labour income in the tradable and non-tradable sectors ($\alpha^N$) and ($\alpha^T = 0.5$). With most householders spending approximately 25 percent of their time at work, the labour share usually made to 0.25 and the annual depreciation rate of capital is 0.10 for sectors.

The country-specific parameters in Tables A2 and A3 are derived from the Mendoza and Oviedo’s (2004) methodology for steady state debt-to-GDP ratio, while the persistence and volatility of productivity and terms of trade are estimated from the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter against the trend series. Using the ratio of tax expense to taxable income, the effective tax rates are derived and sales tax is used as effective tax on goods and services (Ovalle and Ramirez 2014). Beta $\beta$, which is the discount factor that determines
the optimality of consumption, labour, capital and investment, is computed from the real lending rate for each economy.

**Table A2: Description of Country-Specific Parameters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Methodology and Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\bar{b}$</td>
<td>Steady state debt ratio</td>
<td>Mendoza-Oviedo: (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{b}{y}$</td>
<td>Effective income tax rate</td>
<td>1990-2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau_i$</td>
<td>Effective tax rate on goods and services</td>
<td>1990-2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau_c$</td>
<td>Persistent productivity shock</td>
<td>1990-2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_a$</td>
<td>Persistent terms of trade shock</td>
<td>1990-2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_a$</td>
<td>Volatility productivity shock</td>
<td>1990-2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{\tau_i}$</td>
<td>Volatility terms of trade shock</td>
<td>1990-2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>Discount Factor</td>
<td>1990-2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table A3: Country-Specific Parameters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>$\rho_a$</th>
<th>$\rho_{\xi}$</th>
<th>$\sigma_a$</th>
<th>$\sigma_{\xi}$</th>
<th>$\tau_i$</th>
<th>$\tau_c$</th>
<th>$\beta$</th>
<th>$\frac{b}{y}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bahamas</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The country-specific parameters show a discount factor averaging 0.98 for the nine economies studied; this implies a quarterly real interest rate of approximately 2 percent, with effective rate of 8 percent. The Bahamas has the highest discount factor of (0.99) with four economies having a factor of 0.97.

The steady state debt-to-GDP ratio, calculated from Mendoza and Oviedo’s (2004) methodology, which determines a ratio based on the difference between the minimum levels of income and spending with respect to GDP, divided by the interest-growth rate differential. The smaller economies of the region averaged a higher steady state level of approximately 0.90, with Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis are all close or above this average.

The persistence and volatility shock parameters for productivity and terms of trade are obtained from the HP-filtered data against the trend of per capita output and the real exchange rate. The highest persistence is observed among the Bahamian data of 0.61 and 0.57. The volatility parameter shows that Antigua and Barbuda experience higher levels than most other economies within the sample of economies.
Effective Income tax rate and rate for goods and services are also outlined in Table A3. The income tax rates for most economies are usually based on a progressive system of taxes, as higher income earners pay higher taxes. Throughout these economies the effective rate is based on taxable expense against taxable income. In this study the value-added tax or sales tax is used as a measure to determine the effective tax rate on goods and services.

**Moments**

Using the autocorrelations and the standard deviations of the productivity and terms of trade shocks along with cost adjustment parameter, the correlations and standard deviations of the key variables for the detrended data are produced covering the period 1990-2012. Table A4 reports the moments of the data across the economies. The results show that model closely matches the data. Indeed, the smallness and openness of the economies studied contribute to macroeconomic volatility and liquidity-constrained householders do not encourage persistence in output and consumption (Ovalle and Ramirez 2014; and Kumhof and Laxton 2013).

**Tables A4. Moments of the Data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Auto-correlations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>0.62</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private consumption</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C

The Bahamas

Belize

Barbados

ECCU

Appendix D: The Bahamas

Appendix E: Belize
Appendix F: Barbados

Output

Consumption

Investment

Employment

Appendix G: ECCU

Output

Consumption

Investment

Employment
References


Bergman, Michael, and Michael Hutchison (2014). Fiscal rules and government efficiency in reducing procyclicality in emerging and developing economies. University of Copenhagen, Denmark and University of California, Santa Cruz.


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