



**External Borrowing: Source of Development Financing for  
CARICOM Countries in the 1990's?**  
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Paper presented at  
The Conference on Financing Development in the Caribbean  
Sam Lord's Castle, Barbados.  
December 4 to December 8, 1989

**CONFERENCE ON  
FINANCING  
DEVELOPMENT  
IN THE CARIBBEAN**

The Conference on Financing Development in the Caribbean is sponsored by Commonwealth Secretariat, Regional Programme of Monetary Studies and The Central Bank of Barbados

Organized by the Caribbean Development Agency and the Central Bank of Barbados

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( BYRON BLAKE)

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The Author wishes to acknowledge the tremendous assistance from Mr Sundar, Mr Bruce Brady and Ms Allision Johnson of the Technical Assistance Group and Mrs Joyce Lestrade of the Economics Affairs Division of the Commonwealth Secretariat in providing data and comments on the text. They do not however share any responsibility for any errors or misinterpretations.

Thanks is also due to the secretaries in the Economic Affairs Division who typed the manuscript under severe constraints of time.

EXTERNAL BORROWINGS: SOURCE OF DEVELOPMENT FINANCING  
FOR CARICOM COUNTRIES IN THE 1990's?

I. INTRODUCTION

Traditionally external resources whether in the form of loans, grants or direct investment have always played a significant role in building or rebuilding production capacity especially with respect to physical infrastructure. This has tended to be the case particularly where the foreign exchange earning capacity of the country deteriorated sharply whether due to natural disasters, man-made causes such as war, or economic factors such as sudden and persistent adverse change in the (terms of trade). Major examples include pre-industrial Europe (with resources from the colonies in the Americas, the Caribbean, Asia and Africa); post World War II Europe (with resources from the United States of America); North America (with resources from Europe) and late and post colonial Latin America and the Caribbean (with resources from North America and Europe). These examples featured very different types of inflows and reflow obligations. In the case of pre-industrial Europe and the colonies the resources were extracted by coercion and taxation. They did not therefore entail any repayment or profit repatriation obligations from Europe. In the case of post-World War II Europe and the United States, the resources involved the cancellation of previous debts and debt servicing obligations, together with massive grants and soft loans<sup>1</sup>. The repayment obligations were minimal in relation to the initial resource flow. The case of North America and Europe involved, in the main, persons who moved and settled with their investments, thereby reducing the profit repatriation obligations. In the case of late and post colonial Latin America and the Caribbean, the resources from Europe and North America were essentially in the form of direct and portfolio investments. These resources entailed repatriation and repayment obligations either in relation to the profitability of the enterprises or on a pre-determined basis. The obligations were either in perpetuity or for a fixed period. There was thus a qualitative difference between the first three cases and the last case.

Among the countries in the last group, the Caribbean (CARICOM) countries have historically had a situation of significant outflows of

resources (in the form of profits or adverse terms of trade) simultaneously with inflows of new direct investments, loans and grants. The net position had invariably been favourable however, so that most of the countries in the group maintained positive external reserves and a manageable external debt.

This situation changed dramatically in the 1980's. The total external debt of CARICOM countries increased significantly during the first five years of the current international debt crisis which began in 1982. In aggregate, the debt of eight of the thirteen countries, which would account for approximately 98 per cent of the total debt of the region, increased from US\$6.74 billion to US\$8.63 billion, equivalent to a rise of 28 per cent. The increase in the debt of the individual countries varied. In five of the eight countries this ranged between 25 per cent and 40 per cent. The extreme cases were The Bahamas whose total external debt declined by 12 per cent and St. Vincent and the Grenadines where it increased by 62 per cent.

Yet, inspite of this increase in indebtedness, total GDP declined and unemployment worsened significantly. This implies a weak relationship between the rate of growth in indebtedness and the rate of growth in GDP. Put differently it suggests that the rate of inflow of external resources; - not necessarily in the form of loans - must be much faster than the desired rate of growth in GDP<sup>2</sup> to produce a positive impact.

One of the fundamental explanation for this is that the CARICOM countries are small economies with high import propensities. This naturally high import tendency has been reinforced by policies designed to liberalise imports. The net effect has been that any increase in GDP is highly dependent on the availability of foreign exchange to provide the required imported input into production. A second explanation has been the rapid decline in the commodity terms of trade for most of the major export products of the region in the 1980s which reduced the amount of earned foreign exchange available.

Export of goods and services has been growing at a much slower rate than external indebtedness and external debt servicing. An increasing proportion of the earnings from the export of goods and services is being pre-empted to service the current external debt. The issue for policy and development financing is therefore the extent to which the existing stock of

debt will constraint the ability of the Region to augment development resources by contracting new debt; divert foreign exchange earned from the export of goods and service from re-investment in imports for production or discourage new in flows of direct investment.

The objective of this Paper is to explore these issues with a view to determining whether external borrowing is likely to constitute a major source of development financing for the CARICOM countries in the 1990's or whether their current debt will be a constraint to the mobilisation of development finance in the future.

The analysis of the debt situation has been undertaken essentially on the basis of the data for The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago. This approach has been adopted because of the well-known difficulties in obtaining reliable, consistent and relatively current data for CARICOM countries especially in relation to indebtedness. Most of the relevant data for the period 1983 to 1987 for the eight countries selected are contained in the World Debt Tables produced by the World Bank. This data has been supplemented for Belize, Guyana and Jamaica by their data held on the Commonwealth Secretariat Debt Reporting and Management System and from other sources. For consistency and comparability - though not necessarily reliability - reliance has been placed on the World Bank data.

The analysis covers the long-term debt, IMF credits and short-term debt as defined by the World Bank. Given the reporting capacity and practices of CARICOM countries, the data on private non-guaranteed long-term debt, would be estimates. This, fortunately, is sufficiently low as not to pose a problem for the overall analysis.

## SECTION II. IS THE CURRENT CARICOM DEBT A CONSTRAINT?

### - Extent of Current External Indebtedness

The total external debt of the eight countries under analysis was approximately US\$8.6 billion in 1987. (See Table 1). This represented an increase of some 28 per cent above the level in 1983. The total external debt fell by 4.6 per cent in 1984 compared with 1983. This fall was due essentially

to a reduction in the short-term debt of Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago and the long-term debt of The Bahamas. The total debt however increased in 1985 (13.4 per cent), in 1986 (12.1 per cent) and again in 1987 (5.7 per cent).

The build-up of the region's external indebtedness involved a net in flow of additional resources, although at a declining rate, upto 1985. This position changed after 1985. The Region experienced a total negative net transfer of US\$104 million in 1986 and US\$459 million in 1987. The build-up in the debt in the later period reflects the rescheduling (voluntary and involuntary) and the use of new loans to meet debt servicing obligations.

The contribution of the various countries to the total debt differed significantly. Jamaica's contribution which was at 49 per cent in 1983, varied between 46.2 per cent and 51.5 per cent over the period. The Jamaica debt grew significantly, if erratically, over the period. It registered a 4 per cent increase in 1984, 12.2 per cent in 1985, 3.4 per cent in 1986 and 11.2 per cent in 1987. The relatively large increases in 1985 and 1987 reflected the large reschedulings by the commercial banks and some bilateral creditors in those years. Whilst the proportion of Jamaica's debt bears a close relationship to that country's proportion of the total population, it bore no relationship to the country's contribution to the region's production (GDP or GNP). Jamaica's contribution to the total GDP varied between 15 and 24 per cent. The increase in Jamaica's external debt was not strictly related to increase in output. The largest annual increase in Jamaica's debt occurred in 1985 which coincided with a negative growth in output.

Trinidad and Tobago was the second largest contributor to the region's debt with a share of between 19 per cent and 23 per cent. Guyana, the third largest debtor, accounted for between 14 per cent and 15 per cent. The aggregate contribution of these three countries, which exhibited the slowest rate of growth of GDP over the period, to the total debt of the region ranged between 81 per cent and 87 per cent.

While the total debt of the region increased by 28 per cent over the 1983-87 period, the total long-term debt increased by 44 per cent. One effect of this was the increase in the proportion of long-term debt in the total debt

from 71.6 per cent to 80.7 per cent.<sup>3</sup> Total short-term debt decreased over the period and its contribution in the total debt also decreased from 17.2 per cent to 10 per cent. The use of IMF credits remained relatively stable, varying between a high of 11.7 per cent and a low of 9.4 per cent of the total during the period. (See Table 2 for more details).

Interest payments grew by US\$67 million or 19 per cent over the five year period. (See Table 7). There was an increase in interest payments in every year except in 1984 when interest payments actually fell by 6.2 per cent.

The relatively low growth in interest payments over the period was due largely to three factors. There was a fall in the overall rate of interest on loans over the period, a fall in the debt and hence debt servicing of The Bahamas, one of the countries which traditionally paid among the highest rates of interest and the involuntary rescheduling of interest due by Guyana. Total interest payment by Guyana in fact fell by 12 million, that is from 28 million dollars to 16 million between 1983 and 1987 despite the 32 per cent increase in Guyana's total external debt.

The change in interest payment outlay varied significantly among the countries. Although relatively small, outlay on interest by Grenada and St. Vincent and the Grenadines more than doubled (125 per cent and 117 per cent respectively) over the period. Interest payments by Barbados, Belize and Jamaica also increased significantly by 88 per cent, 74 per cent and 50 per cent respectively. The Bahamas, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago were making lower outlays on interest at the end of the period by 50 per cent, 43 per cent and 0.8 per cent respectively.

Interest payments on the external debt of the region would have increased at a faster rate in the last part of the 1980's and seem set to continue into the 1990's as a result of the combined effect of the increased size of the debt stock, higher international interest rates and the reduced ability of Guyana, to effect involuntary rescheduling of interest payments as a result of the agreements reached with the multilateral financial institutions.



## - Nature, Structure and Source of Debt

The long-term debt of the CARICOM countries is essentially public and publicly guaranteed loans. In fact only in the case of Jamaica was any private non-guaranteed loan reported. Even for Jamaica this was a minimal and declining factor, falling steadily from 2 per cent to 1.3 per cent of Jamaica's total debt between 1983 and 1987. For the region as a whole, this represented between 1.2 per cent and 0.7 per cent of total loans.

In terms of source, approximately two-thirds of the public and publicly guaranteed loans have come from official creditors and the remainder from private sources. These proportions remained fairly constant for each of the five years to 1987. Table 3 gives the break-down over the period for the total and for each country. The individual country break-down showed greater variation. Three countries - The Bahamas, Barbados, and Trinidad and Tobago accessed the private market for more than the regional average amount of loans. In the cases of the Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago, the proportions were in fact reversed, with two-thirds of the long-term loans coming from private sources. The Bahamas whose total long-term debt decreased over the period, reduced its private borrowings significantly. Private borrowings remained roughly 84 per cent of a declining total debt over the first three years as official borrowings remained constant in both absolute and percentage terms. Borrowings from public sources, while small, more than doubled between 1985 and 1987 in absolute and relative terms reaching US\$ 76.9 million or 35 per cent of the total long-term debt. Trinidad and Tobago displayed the opposite tendency as private borrowings increased steadily each year in both absolute and relative terms rising from US\$861 million, 63.6 per cent of the total, in 1983 to US\$1,364 million or 73.3 per cent in 1987. In the case of Barbados, the proportion of private borrowings fluctuated but with a tendency to increase, reaching 50 per cent of the total in 1987.

For the other five countries private long-term borrowing remained at less than 25 per cent of total long-term debt with a tendency to decline. Private long-term borrowings declined steadily from 2.8 per cent in 1983 to 0.5 per cent in 1987 in the case of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 9.2 per cent to 3.0 per cent in Grenada and 18.0 per cent to 10 per cent in Belize. In the cases of Guyana and Jamaica the proportion of private-long term

borrowings was approximately 20 per cent and 15 per cent respectively but with a tendency to decline.

The behaviour of public long-term borrowing reflected more the policy perspectives of the creditors than of the borrowers. Resource constraints coupled with an expansion in the number of and demand from low income borrowers, led the World Bank, the main supplier of long-term public credit, to seek to graduate, even from its commercial resources, borrowers such as The Bahamas, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. The increasingly conservative approach of private creditors and their reluctance to increase their exposure in highly indebted countries explain, in large measure, the low level of disbursement to Belize, Grenada and St. Vincent and the Grenadines and the stagnation in Jamaica and Guyana. The World Bank has constantly assessed Belize, Grenada and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, at best to be of limited creditworthiness. The Bank's assessment of Grenada, for example, in 1988, was that given "the nature and magnitude of the domestic and external imbalances, and the high level of external debt at present, Grenada is not creditworthy for nonconcessional lending. Grenada should depend entirely on concessional external assistance over the medium term".<sup>4</sup>

A more detailed analysis of the sources of long-term public and publicly guaranteed debt (See Table 3 and Table 5) reveals a shift from bilateral to multilateral sources. Loans by bilateral creditors peaked at 42.3 per cent of total long-term loans in 1984. This percentage has declined steadily since, falling to 37.0 per cent in 1987. The exposure by the multilateral institutions, on the other hand has increased steadily, from 26.5 per cent in 1983 and 1984 to 30.8 per cent in 1987. The shift from bilateral to multilateral sources reflects the 61.4 per cent increase in multilateral credits, over the period compared with the 25.5 per cent increase in bilateral credits. Suppliers credit, which grew relatively slowly over the period in absolute terms (13 per cent), declined in relative terms from 5.5 per cent to 4.5 per cent of the total. The contribution of the financial markets remained constant, at 27 per cent. Loans from the financial markets grew at roughly the same rate as the overall long-term debt.

The contribution of the various source to each country varied significantly. Bilateral credits declined in all countries, with the exception

of Grenada and Jamaica, in at least one of the five years. In which the Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago bilateral credits over the period declined by 22 per cent and 7 per cent respectively. St. Vincent and the Grenadines which received the smallest amount of bilateral loans in 1983 of only US\$ 2 million had a very significant increase in 1984 of almost 400 per cent and this level was maintained over the period. Bilateral credits to Belize and Grenada more than doubled over the period (102 per cent and 107 per cent respectively). Jamaica, whose bilateral credits increased by 36 per cent, was the only other country to exceed the regional average.

The multilateral institutions reduced their exposure to three countries - The Bahamas, Belize and Trinidad and Tobago in 1984 and again to The Bahamas in 1985. Their overall exposure however increased to all countries over the period. The 61 per cent cumulative increase was exceeded by the increase to five countries - The Bahamas, Barbados, Grenada, Jamaica and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The lowest increase, in absolute and relative terms, was to Belize.

Five countries - The Bahamas, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines-borrowed less from the Financial Markets in 1987 than they did in 1983. In fact only Trinidad and Tobago increased its borrowings from this source in each of the five years. While St. Vincent and the Grenadines did not borrow on these markets after 1984, Barbados, Belize and Trinidad and Tobago which were the only net borrowers on the private Financial Markets over the five year period all exceeded the average percentage increase in the exposure of the private markets to the region.

More detailed information on the creditors and their contributions, in terms of new or rescheduled commitments, to Belize, Guyana and Jamaica in the 1983-87 period is presented in Tables 12, 13 and 14.

In Belize, there were only a few active lenders to the public sector in any one year. There was in fact only one multilateral creditor in each year between 1984 and 1987 and there were no bilateral creditors either in 1986 or 1987. This compares with 1983 when four multilateral creditors contributed 51 per cent of loans outstanding and two bilateral creditors contributed 48 per cent, and in 1985 when five bilateral creditors extended 99

per cent of the country's credits. Non-traditional creditors - the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB), Barbados, Mexico and Venezuela - were active in 1985. Belize obtained almost twice as much credit in 1985 as in any other year.

Relatively few creditors made new commitments to Guyana during the 1983 to 1987 period. The IADB and OPEC were the only two creditors to make new loans in 3 of the 5 years. New commitments were in fact very low in 1983 and 1986. Nationalisation and debt rescheduling amounted to approximately 80 per cent of the total of new commitments in 1984, 230 per cent in 1985 and 340 per cent in 1987. Guyana had, at different points, mobilised loans from non-traditional sources such as the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea (DPRK), Barbados and IFAD.

Jamaica mobilised an increasing volume of external resources between 1983 and 1985 and again in 1987. A major portion - 61 per cent in 1985 and 37 per cent in 1987 - of these resources represented rescheduled commercial bank loans. When account is taken of the loans rescheduled by other creditors such as Mexico and Venezuela, rescheduling again amounted to more than 60 per cent of the resources mobilised in 1987. Bilateral credits increased more than threefold in 1984 over 1983 mainly as a result of a near fivefold increase in loans by the United States of America. Bilateral credits however declined by almost fifty per cent in 1985 and again in 1986. This decline also reflected the performance of the United States whose credit fell by 40 per cent between 1984 and 1985 and by a further 72 per cent between 1985 and 1986 so that by 1986 loans from the United States were a mere 17 per cent of the level in 1984.

A range of multilateral and bilateral institutions and agencies extended credit to Jamaica. Non-traditional bilateral lenders such as Italy, Japan, Libya (1986), Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela were active, particularly between 1983 and 1986. Among the traditional sources of finance the World Bank, IDA and the IMF, and the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, the UK and the United States of America provided significant loans during the period. The United States extended more than 15 per cent of total credits in all years except in 1987 when there was significant reschedulings by the commercial banks and certain bilateral creditors such as Venezuela and Mexico.

The terms (interest rates, maturity period, grace period and the grant element) on which the current stock of debt of the CARICOM countries had been accumulated have varied tremendously and erratically among the countries, over time for each country and between creditors (public and private).

It is difficult to identify any strong explanatory factors for the disparity in terms of borrowing. For example, The Bahamas with 84 per cent private borrowings in 1983 and Jamaica with 83 per cent of borrowings from official source attracted the same average interest rate of 7.7 per cent with The Bahamas attracting only a marginally shorter repayment period - 17 years compared to 18.9 years for Jamaica. In 1987, with The Bahamas still borrowing 65 per cent from private sources and Jamaica 86 per cent from public sources, The Bahamas was attracting money at over two percentage points better interest rates (4.1 to 6.8) for the same maturity of 15 years than Jamaica. Looking at three of the smaller and poorer countries - Belize, Grenada and St. Vincent and the Grenadines - all of which received in excess of 80 per cent of their loans from official sources, Belize invariably had terms which were much less advantageous than both Grenada and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Interest rates on loans to Belize were always higher, often by as much as two or three times and the maturities invariably shorter. The "grant element"<sup>5</sup> in the resources mobilised by Belize was invariably lower than for the other two countries even when all raised the bulk of their resources from official sources. The "grant element" to Belize never exceeded 50 per cent and was for three of the five years under 20 per cent reaching as low as 5 per cent in 1986.

Throughout the region, the average interest on new commitments were lower in 1987 than in 1983. In the case of four countries, namely The Bahamas, Grenada, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, the difference in interest rates over the period exceeded 3 percentage points. In fact, only in the case of Jamaica where interest rates averaged 7.7 per cent in 1983 and 6.8 per cent in 1987, was the difference less than one percentage point. This improvement in the interest terms was not repeated in any of the other three areas.

Tables 12-14 present a more detailed picture of the interest rates attracted by the greater part of the loans mobilised by Belize, Guyana and

Jamaica over the period. The data for Belize does not reveal any particular pattern. In the case of Guyana there was a clear tendency for a greater proportion of the bilateral and multilateral loans to be on fixed terms and at less than 5 per cent interest. This reflects the increasing perception of uncreditworthiness for commercial loans and the resultant reduced range of creditors. The weak bargaining power of the country is also reflected in the relatively high and constant spread of 2 1/2 per cent above LIBOR charged on rescheduled commercial loans in 1984, 1985 and 1987.

The data for Jamaica show a strong tendency towards variable interest rates and fixed rates above 5 per cent. The proportion of loans mobilised by Jamaica at lower than 5 per cent fell from 31 per cent in 1983 to 6 per cent in 1987 compared with loans on variable interest rates which increased from 21 per cent to 67 per cent. The interest on commercial loans, the bulk of which represented reschedulings, ranged from the high of LIBOR plus 2 1/4 per cent to LIBOR plus 2 1/2 per cent between 1983 and 1985. The rate on commercial loans fell to LIBOR plus 1 1/4 per cent in 1987.

The maturity period for new borrowings shortened in six of the eight cases, by over three years in four cases. The maturity period lengthened significantly for Grenada and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

The grace period also shortened for four countries but lengthened for four. The "so-called", grant element improved for five countries, deteriorated for two and remained the same for one. This element exceeded 50 per cent for Grenada, Guyana and St. Vincent and the Grenadines in 1987 whereas the highest grant element in 1983 was 46 per cent in the case of Guyana.

#### Debt Repayment Capacity

The debt servicing capacity of a country or region is usually assessed by the relationship of the debt to total production (GDP or GNP) and perhaps more specifically by the ratio of debt service to export earnings. The dynamics of the existing international debt situation, more often than not require the provision of new loans to ensure that debt payments remain current. External resources thus mobilised do not enhance debt servicing

capacity. They reduce it. Put differently, new loans to service existing debt create no new repayment capacity.

In countries such as those in CARICOM where production and more particularly export production has a high foreign import content, the export earnings to debt service ratio can only provide a rough guide. All export earnings will not be available to service debt since external inputs must be provided for new production.

In the CARICOM countries under study, total Gross Domestic Product fell from approximately US\$14.07 billion in 1983 to an estimated US\$12.17 billion in 1987. (The 1987 figure itself was a recovery from the 11.83 billion in 1986 as can be seen from Table 18). GNP (see Table 4) displayed the same pattern falling from approximately US\$14.4 billion in 1983 to an estimated US\$11.3 billion in 1987. The fall in total production was accompanied by stagnation in total export earnings indicating that a higher proportion of total production was being exported. Total earnings from the export of goods and services which amounted to US\$6.24 billion in 1983 peaked at US\$6.82 billion in 1985, but fell to about US\$6.1 billion in 1986.

The fall in the total regional production especially when measured in GNP terms was influenced significantly by a fall in the performance of Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The performance of these countries reflected some fall in physical production but more significantly it reflected the impact of steep devaluations of the domestic currencies.

The growth in the total debt to export ratio was also evident in the debt servicing to export earnings. The percentage of total export earnings of the region devoted to debt servicing more than tripled, from 8.7 per cent to 28.2 per cent, between 1984 and 1987.

The severity of the debt and debt servicing problems of the CARICOM group can be gauged by a comparison with other countries and regions. By 1987, the average debt service ratio for the CARICOM countries had exceeded the debt service ratio for the Low Income African countries and was only seven percentage points below the ratio for the 15 Heavily Indebted Countries. The situation for the CARICOM region deteriorated very rapidly. In 1984 the debt

service ratio was almost five times higher in the Heavily Indebted Countries and three times higher in the Low Income African Countries than in the CARICOM group of countries. Table 8 shows the behaviour of the debt service ratio in these three groups of countries in the 1983-1987 period.

From the perspective of total external debt service to GNP, the average for the CARICOM countries was comparable to that for the Heavily Indebted Countries between 1983 and 1985 and higher than the average for the Low Income African Countries and for all developing countries. In 1986 the ratio for the CARICOM countries as a group worsened resulting in a situation in which CARICOM countries as a group were using a much higher percentage of their total national production to service debt than any of the other group of debtor countries.

The situation varied significantly among the different CARICOM countries. In Guyana and Jamaica total external debt exceeded total production in all five years. In the case of Guyana the ratio of total external debt to GNP increased fivefold by 1987. In terms of debt service to export earnings (see Table 9), this improved from 22.6 per cent in 1983 to 10.1 per cent in 1987, having fallen to as low as 9.2 per cent in 1985. This apparent improvement is misleading however as it reflects payments actually made and masks obligations due but unpaid.

In Jamaica, total external debt which was at 106 per cent of GNP in 1983 rose to 176 per cent in 1987 having peaked at 222 per cent in 1985. The total debt service to export earnings ratio increased from 19 per cent in 1983 to 26 per cent in 1987, having reached as high as 30 per cent in 1986. Debt servicing exceeded 20 per cent of GNP in both 1985 and 1986.

Total debt exceeded or approximated 50 per cent of GNP in Belize and Grenada. The debt servicing burden of these two countries as measured by the ratio of total debt service to export earnings was, however relatively low, being less than 10 per cent except in Belize in 1985 when it was 11.7 per cent.

The total external debt to GNP for St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the other LDC in the group, was below 30 per cent between 1983 and 1986 and



only reached 33 per cent in 1987. The debt service to export earnings was also low, amounting to no more than 3 per cent.

In the case of Barbados, total external debt was less than 50 per cent of GNP in every year except in 1983 when it amounted to 56 per cent. In 1984 and 1985 the ratio was below 40 per cent. Total debt service represented less than 7.5 per cent of earnings from export of goods and services in each year between 1983 and 1986. The call on export earnings, however more than doubled between 1984 and 1986.

In the case of Trinidad and Tobago external debt more than doubled as a percentage of GNP between 1983 and 1987, increasing from 18 per cent to 43 per cent. The pattern of growth was also evident in respect of the percentage of export earnings required for debt servicing. Debt servicing as a percentage of export earnings virtually quadrupled - from 7 per cent to 27 per cent - in the four year period, 1984 to 1987.

In the case of The Bahamas, total external debt as a percentage of GNP decreased steadily, from 16 per cent in 1983 to 9 per cent in 1987. The percentage of total export earnings devoted to the servicing of the external debt also decreased from 3.5 per cent to 2.7 per cent between 1983 and 1986. Excluding Guyana, for which the debt service to export earnings has little meaning, The Bahamas and Grenada were the only countries in the region which were expending a smaller percentage of their foreign exchange earnings on debt servicing at the end of the period than at the beginning. Grenada was however using, twice as large a percentage of its foreign earnings to service its debt as The Bahamas.

In 1983 Guyana and Jamaica were using almost the same percentage of their foreign exchange earnings to service their external debt as the Low Income African Countries and about one-half of the amount that was being used by the Heavily Indebted Countries. Guyana was in fact using a slightly higher percentage, 22.6 per cent compared to 20.8 per cent for the Low Income African Countries. (See Table 9). The debt service ratio for Jamaica and the Low Income African Countries remained very close in each of the five years except in 1984 when the ratio for the Low Income African Countries increased to 26.9 per cent and the ratio for Jamaica remained stable at 19.2 per cent.

### SECTION III. DOES THE TREATMENT OF THE EXISTING CARICOM COUNTRIES DEBT PROVIDE NEW RESOURCES?

In spite of the increasing burden of debt servicing, the CARICOM debtor countries, with the exception of Guyana, have been meeting their debt servicing obligations. The international creditor community has, against the background of its agreed strategy of the "case by case" and "menu" approach, intervened in different ways for the different countries, to ensure continued servicing of the debt. Among the issues of concern are a) whether such interventions are sufficient quantitatively and qualitatively to treat with the deteriorating debt situation? b) Whether the CARICOM debtor countries are being treated on par with, or less advantageously, than other similarly placed debtor countries? c) The extent to which current and proposed international strategies are likely to impact positively on the external debt stock and debt servicing burden of the CARICOM debtor countries; and d) The extent to which current strategies for treating with the CARICOM countries' debt releases or provides new resources for development financing.

The most heavily exposed among the CARICOM debtor countries, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, have had to approach their external creditors for assistance with their current external debt. The CARICOM countries as a group have also approached the international community to seek a focus on and treatment of the debt of small middle income countries in a manner which would ensure that the productive capacity of these countries was not weakened and that they did not drift further into "debt distress".

The international creditor community has not yet responded with any common strategy to focus specifically on the debt situation of this group, the 'so called' middle income, debtor countries.

The current approaches towards debt reduction, as distinct from debt service amelioration through reschedulings have all by-passed the CARICOM countries. No CARICOM debtor country was listed among the 15 potential beneficiaries under the Baker Plan. While Jamaica is included among the 39 debtor countries listed by the US Treasury as possible candidates for relief under the Brady Plan, the major prerequisite, substantial activity in the private secondary market, is unlikely to be met to any significant extent.

The Toronto approach, on the other hand, focused on low income countries in sub-Saharan Africa. In light of this geographic focus, a CARICOM debtor country such as Guyana, which on all objective bases must be considered a low income heavily indebted country, was refused Toronto terms in the Paris Club reschedulings which were concluded in 1989. The international creditor community has in fact responded differently to the situation of the three CARICOM countries. These must therefore be reviewed separately.

Jamaica, with a total external debt of just over US\$4 billion in 1987, owed 50 per cent to bilateral creditors, 36 per cent to the multilateral financial institutions and 14 per cent to commercial banks and providers of suppliers credit. Given the structure of its debt obligations, Jamaica has had to approach, both the Paris Club of official creditors and the London Club of commercial bank creditors for restructuring.

The commercial banks agreed in March 1987 to reschedule 100 per cent of the principal falling due between April 1985 and the end of 1986 and 100 per cent of the maturities falling due between January 1987 and March 31, 1990. The amounts involved were US\$185 million and US\$180 million. This followed reschedulings in 1983, 1984 and 1985. The terms on which the 1987 loans were rescheduled were perhaps average for reschedulings of commercial loans in that year. The interest rate of 1 1/4 per cent above LIBOR, for example, was a significant improvement on the interest rates in earlier Jamaica reschedulings - 2 1/4 per cent, 2 1/4-2 3/8 per cent and 2 1/2 per cent above LIBOR in 1983, 1984 and 1985 respectively but high compared with the interest charged on other countries reschedulings in 1987. Debtor countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Honduras, Mozambique, the Philippines and Venezuela, had reschedulings on better terms than Jamaica while debtor countries such as the Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Morocco, Romania, Poland, Uruguay and Zaire, were on less favourable terms. The terms obtained by the Dominican Republic and Nigeria were very similar to those received by Jamaica.

The fundamental consideration underpinning the efforts of the international creditor community to treat with the debt of the CARICOM countries is to ensure debt servicing thereby maintaining the liquidity of the debt. There has been no effort to reduce the stock of debt either through

forgiveness, write-off or write-down. The techniques applied, essentially interest capitalisation and the rescheduling of principal at variable - generally increasing - interest rates, have the effect of enlarging the stock of debt. The Jamaica and Guyana experiences also demonstrate clearly that the approaches are also not designed to make any significant volume of new resources available. In the case of Guyana rescheduled loans were several times more than new resources mobilised in 1985 and 1987. For Jamaica, rescheduled loans represented slightly more than one dollar for each dollar of new resources borrowed. The situation in respect of Jamaica and Guyana will be repeated for Trinidad and Tobago in the near future.

Given the weight of Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago in the external resource requirement of the region and the current strategy of treating with the debt of these countries, the clear direction is towards the pre-empting of external resources rather than the release of new resources for development. This trend will worsen on present policies.

#### SECTION IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CARICOM as a Region and several of the individual States are now highly exposed. The conclusion is the same whether viewed from the standpoint of total external debt to total production or exports or, more critically, from the standpoint of the debt servicing ratios. These measures of exposure would have worsened in the post 1987 period as a result of the combined effect of increased borrowing (mainly to maintain the solvency of the existing debt stock) and reschedulings; the fall in the value of the Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica domestic currencies; and increasing interest rates.

The current external debt and its servicing requirements have exceeded the critical levels (from the perspective of creditors) for the Region as a whole and for some of the individual countries. The ability of some of the countries to raise new loans, especially loans to be guaranteed by the public sector, has been constrained both by creditors' assessment of their continued creditworthiness and by limits set in international agreements with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

The Government Jamaica was unable to give a letter of comfort to OPIC in October 1989 for a private sector loan while the Government of Guyana was

unable to commit itself to a soft loan from the EEC in 1989 because of their external ceilings. The loans were for projects in priority areas of agriculture and telecommunications. Excluding The Bahamas and Barbados, the CARICOM Countries, where the existing debt would permit further borrowing, are the smaller countries which have been consistently rated as either not having or just barely having the capacity to take commercial resources.

Improvement in the credit standing of the countries and the Region as a whole will require major improvements in production and exports. This, however, is not likely to be sufficient. If we assume a doubling of production and exports by the mid-1990s, no additional borrowing and no further depreciation of the exchange rates, <sup>6</sup> the exposure ratios would still be relatively high. The debt to GDP ratio would still be in excess of 30 per cent.

The most obvious conclusion is that action will be required on both sides. Increased production and export must be accompanied by significant debt reduction. The current stock of debt is a major constraint to further external borrowing and its servicing a most inefficient use of new resources.

The general approach of the international creditor community to the Region has not been towards debt reduction or even towards debt restructuring and rescheduling on the most favourable terms. <sup>7</sup> There is the underlying assumption that, as middle-income countries, these debtors can or can be made to service their outstanding debt. Yet, any detailed analysis of the size and composition of the current stock of debt, the terms on which it has accumulated and the debt servicing capacity of the debtor countries would indicate that debt servicing cannot be sustained. The resources available to support the required new export production is not available, and there are no strong indication that the prices of the Region's major primary exports are likely to increase significantly. A strategy to release a part of the current outflow for productive investment is necessary to ensure the long-term viability of the debtor countries and the sustainability of debt repayment. The strategy must be comprehensive and involve a contribution by all parties.

It must involve a significant element of debt reduction and improvements in payments terms. There is a pivotal role for the multilateral financial institutions, holders of a major share of the outstanding debt of the Region; these institutions have previously played no direct role in debt reduction in the Region or elsewhere.

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There are two aspects of the action required of the multilateral financial institutions, in particular, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to encourage and facilitate debt reduction on a cooperative and sustainable basis. The first aspect is the reduction of their own stock of outstanding loans and the second is indirect support for the reduction of the debt outstanding to the private commercial creditors. Taking account of the MFI's reluctance to directly reduce their loans and of their possibility to make grants or very soft loans a comprehensive approach to the debt reduction issue, could involve the following elements:

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- the MFI's would make a grant equivalent to about one-third of their outstanding loans and interest (calculated for about seven (7) years into the future) to an agreed financial institution for investment to meet payments on the total debt (rescheduled and unrescheduled) from year 8. The institution charged with investing the grant - The Guardian Institution - would be free to decide on the nature, placement, spread etc. but with due regard to the objective of the debt servicing at the agreed time; \*
  
- Private commercial creditors would reschedule principal and interest with a grace period of seven years. The interest foregone in the grace period would be the commercial creditors contribution to the debt reduction scheme;

/...

- Bilateral creditors would also reschedule the outstanding loans - principal and interest - with a grace period of seven years. They could also assist the debt reduction process further, by measures such as the conversion of a portion of their outstanding loans into grants and the provision of a larger portion of any new resources on a grant basis;
- The debtor countries would be required to -
  - (a) continue to service the current debt to the multilateral financial institutions during the grace period. Resources for servicing these loans would be from export earnings and new soft loans by the MFI's on a 50:50 basis. The soft loans would be added to the total MFI's loans at the end of the grace period;
  - (b) place 25 per cent of the current debt servicing payments on the rescheduled loans, that is the outstanding loans to the private and bilateral creditors, yearly, in a fund with the Guardian Institution;
- The interest charged on the rescheduled loans and by the multilateral financial institutions would be at a fixed and concessional rate.
- New borrowings by the debtor countries would be severely restricted in the grace period, with a view to bringing the debt service ratios within some agreed limits. The rate of growth of economy would thus be set by export performance, expenditure on consumer imports and the ability to mobilize external grant resources.

The first two factors would be the most important and their behaviour is within the policy competence of the debtor countries.

- The Guardian Institution could be the main development bank servicing the debtor countries concerned. In the case of the CARICOM Countries, this would be the Caribbean Development Bank. (The African Development Bank could play the role for African debtor countries, Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) for Central America and the Inter-American Development Bank for Latin America and Caribbean countries not covered by the CDB).

\*

This debt reduction strategy recognises the constraints of, and provides a role within those constraints for each of the parties involved. There are no "Free Riders".

The analysis of the debt accumulation in relation to production and export growth in the 1980s suggests strongly that borrowed resources were, in significant measure, inefficiently used to finance consumption and, in case, to facilitate flight capital. A part of the resources mobilised as additional loans was also inefficiently used to service existing loans. This leads to our second recommendation. An increasing proportion of any new external loan resources mobilised must be directed to projects and more particularly to providing the foreign exchange required to facilitate production, especially export production. External grant resources should also be significantly project-related to build up the domestic infrastructure - physical and human - required to facilitate efficient production in the short- and long-term. Resources released to the Governments by way of reduced payment obligations should be identified and used to strengthen the general infrastructure of the countries. The reduced external obligation should not provide opportunity for reduced fiscal or budgetary discipline on the part of Central Governments.



The constraint implicit in the current debt burden and undesirability, in any event of increasing the present stock of debt of the Region and of several of the individual countries, suggest the need for greater emphasis to be placed on new sources of non-debt creating inflows. One potential source is the large Caribbean Community overseas. The Caribbean nationals could be encouraged to save or invest in the Region. Apart from appropriate institutional facilities to mobilise such savings, certain policy changes and incentives would be necessary. These would include stability of exchange rates or at least the rates applicable to such investments, the ability to freely repatriate principal and interest and the ability to earn interest in foreign exchange. The rate of interest would need to be competitive, with international rates, provide for a risk element, but not be based on domestic interest rates. 10

## FOOTNOTES

1. The Marshall Plan provide.
2. It has been argued that an annual rate of growth of at least 6 per cent in GDP will be required in the decade of the 90's if the existing high rate of unemployment and underemployment is not to deteriorate further. This would suggest that an increase in external resource inflows or even particularly external indebtedness of more than 6 per cent per year will be required in the 1990s.
3. From a developmental standpoint long-term debt is more beneficial than short-term debt. In the instant case however, too much significance should not be put on this as the shift was to loan from the multilateral financial institution with maturation of 18 to 60 months, which in a developmental context must still be considered short-term.
4. World Bank "Caribbean Region: Current Situation, Issues and Prospects" April 1988.
5. The Grant Element of the loan which is used to measure the overall cost of the borrowing is the committed present value less the discounted present value of the contractual debt service. This definition does not take account of the tied nature of much of the official resources especially from the bilateral sources. This often results in procurement at prices much higher than could be obtained with untied resources permitting international tenders. In such cases interest is being paid on a higher principal. The definition also ignores the impact of variable exchange rates. [In any event a discount rate of 10 per cent, implying international inflation of 10 per cent per annum is high.]
6. These are all very restrictive and unrealistic assumptions made only to illustrate the severity of the problem. A doubling of production, between 1987 and 1995, implies an annual growth of        per cent in real terms, levels not achieved since the 19        and against a background of 1        real growth in the immediate past. Furthermore, increased production, particularly of export goods, would require imports which could only be financed from new borrowings. The rates of exchange of three of the currencies have already depreciated.
7. There are several constraints. Firstly, there is the relatively high proportion of the debt which is to the multilateral creditors. These creditors do not currently reschedule. Secondly, the CARICOM countries are located away from the geographic focus of the bilateral donors for the purposes of debt amelioration and reduction. This was clearly demonstrated by the refusal of these donors in the Paris Club to extend to Guyana the terms extended to similarly placed debtors from Sub-Saharan Africa. Thirdly, the commercial creditors are preoccupied with the large debtors in Latin America. Fourthly, there is a paucity of attractive, publicly owned projects which can be used in debt conversion schemes based on equity. Debt conversion would need to be based on investment in new projects.

8. The Inter-American Development Bank has argued that for Latin America as a whole, improved disbursements of loans reflected different uses of some of the external capital for example, for balance of payments rather than investment purposes. (See Economic and Social Progress in Latin America: 1989 Report p. 25.) The data for Guyana and Jamaica - two of the major CARICOM debtors - confirm this for the Caribbean. (See Tables 19 and 20.) At the end of 1987 only 23 per cent of the outstanding debt of Jamaica and 52 per cent of that for Guyana were identified as attributed to projects.
9. The selection of projects and the efficiency of these projects will be critical if the long-term objectives of strengthened debt servicing capacity and improved external credit ratings are to be achieved.
10. A domestic interest rate policy designed to discourage consumption would not be relevant to the national abroad. The payment of his interest in foreign currency thereby guaranteeing its value, together with interest rates comparable with those abroad, would be more relevant considerations.

Selected GNP-based Economic Indicators for Selected CARICOM Countries 1983-1987

Country	GNP (US\$ mn)	XGS (US\$ mn)	MGS (US\$ mn)	1983		Exchange Rate US\$
				% LTD/GNP	% EOT/GNP	
Bahamas	1609.5	1262.0	1306.2	14.7	16.4	1.0
Barbados	1035.0	698.0	761.0	28.3	55.9	2.0
Belize	166.6			45.3	60.2	2.0
Grenada	93.9	40.6	80.3	47.9	56.7	2.7
Guyana	425.0	226.0	382.0	163.5	228.5	3.03
Jamaica	3137.0	1374.0	1789.0	77.7	105.6	1.93
St. Vincent & Grenadines	89.0	59.1	81.1	24.2	27.1	2.7
Trinidad & Tobago	7843.0	2577.0	3498.0	13.1	18.3	2.40
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1439.0</b>	<b>6236.7</b>				
1984						
Bahamas	1892.6	1326.1	1376.8	10.9	12.0	1.0
Barbados	1134.0	827.0	823.0	26.9	34.4	2.0
Belize	178.0	127.0	159.8	42.6	54.2	2.0
Grenada	100.7	42.1	73.6	43.5	49.8	2.7
Guyana	352.0	246.0	346.0	192.9	277.6	3.83
Jamaica	2144.0	1361.0	1788.0	120.9	160.7	3.94
St. Vincent & Grenadines	97.0	72.7	89.2	22.1	24.1	2.7
Trinidad & Tobago	7649.0	2581.0	2031.0	13.9	16.0	2.40
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>13546.3</b>	<b>6582.9</b>				
1985						
Bahamas	2158.1	1542.0	1580.7	8.6	10.0	1.0
Barbados	1191.0	797.0	762.0	30.3	38.4	2.0
Belize	180.9	127.6	155.1	52.5	65.5	2.0
Grenada	113.7	52.9	91.4	42.4	46.2	2.7
Guyana	363.0	262.0	254.0	203.6	205.2	4.25
Jamaica	1742.0	1358.0	1789.0	172.5	222.0	5.55
St. Vincent & Grenadines	106.1	82.6	92.3	21.9	24.0	2.7
Trinidad & Tobago	7382.0	2595.0	2626.0	17.6	19.6	2.45
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>13236.8</b>	<b>6817.1</b>				
1986						
Bahamas	2309.2	1614.5	1633.2	8.8	10.9	1.0
Barbados	1301.0	769.0	786.0	35.7	47.0	2.0
Belize	197.5	131.2	160.1	50.0	61.5	2.0
Grenada	124.5	61.5	107.4	42.7	45.6	2.7
Guyana	395.0			204.6	313.9	4.27
Jamaica	2147.0	1465.0	1598.0	147.8	186.3	5.48
St. Vincent & Grenadines	113.9	87.5	100.5	25.3	27.9	
Trinidad & Tobago	4800.0	1734.0	2125.0	33.0	38.7	3.60
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>11388.1</b>	<b>5862.7</b>				
1987						
Bahamas	2551.9			6.8	9.1	1.0
Barbados	1348.0			37.2	46.1	2.0
Belize		151.9	176.2	ERR	ERR	2.0
Grenada	134.6			49.6	53.3	2.7
Guyana	247.0			353.8	520.2	9.76
Jamaica	2528.0	1692.0	1916.0	141.2	175.9	5.49
St. Vincent & Grenadines	119.1			30.2	32.7	
Trinidad & Tobago	4160.0			39.3	43.3	3.60
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>11088.6</b>					

Table 1

## External Debt of Selected CARICOM Countries 1983-1987 (US\$ Million)

Country	1983			
	LTD	IMF Credit	STD	EDT
Bahamas	236.7	0.0	27.0	263.7
Barbados	293.0	37.0	249.0	579.0
Belize	75.5	3.8	21.0	100.3
Grenada	45.0	5.7	2.5	53.2
Guyana	695.0	77.0	199.0	971.0
Jamaica	2436.0	627.0	250.0	3313.0
St.Vin.&Gren.	21.5	1.6	1.0	24.1
Trin.&Tob.	1026.0	0.0	412.0	1438.0
TOTAL	4828.7	752.1	1161.5	6742.3
% of TOTAL	71.6	11.2	17.2	

Country	1984							
	LTD	Annual % Change	IMF Credit	Annual % Change	STD	Annual % Change	EDT	Annual % Change
Bahamas	206.7	-12.7	0.0	ERR	20.0	-25.9	226.7	-14.0
Barbados	305.0	4.1	43.0	16.2	42.0	-83.1	390.0	-32.6
Belize	75.8	0.4	4.7	23.7	16.0	-23.8	96.5	-3.8
Grenada	43.8	-2.7	4.5	-21.1	1.8	-28.0	50.1	-5.8
Guyana	679.0	-2.3	71.0	-7.8	227.0	14.1	977.0	0.6
Jamaica	2592.0	6.4	629.0	0.3	224.0	-10.4	3445.0	4.0
St.Vin.&Gren.	21.4	-0.5	1.0	-37.5	1.0	0.0	23.4	-2.9
Trin.&Tob.	1063.0	3.6	0.0	ERR	159.0	-61.4	1222.0	-15.0
TOTAL	4986.7	3.3	753.2	0.1	690.8	-40.5	6430.7	-4.6
% of TOTAL	77.5		11.7		10.7			

Country	1985							
	LTD	Annual % Change	IMF Credit	Annual % Change	STD	Annual % Change	EDT	Annual % Change
Bahamas	186.5	-9.8	0.0	ERR	29.0	45.0	215.5	✓ -4.9
Barbados	361.0	18.4	48.0	11.6	48.0	14.3	457.0	17.2
Belize	94.9	25.2	10.5	123.4	13.0	-18.8	118.4	22.7
Grenada	48.2	10.0	2.7	-40.0	1.6	-11.1	52.5	4.8
Guyana	739.0	8.8	79.0	11.3	290.0	27.8	1108.0	13.4
Jamaica	3005.0	15.9	693.0	10.2	169.0	-24.6	3867.0	12.2
St.Vin.&Gren.	23.2	8.4	0.3	-70.0	2.0	100.0	25.5	9.0
Trin.&Tob.	1299.0	22.2	0.0	ERR	149.0	-6.3	1448.0	18.5
TOTAL	5756.8	15.4	833.5	10.7	701.6	1.6	7291.9	13.4
% of TOTAL	78.9		11.4		9.6			

Table 1 (Contd)

Country	1986							
	LTD	Annual % Change	IMF Credit	Annual % Change	STD	Annual % Change	EDT	Annual % Change
Bahamas	202.1	8.4	0.0	ERR	50.0	72.4	252.1	17.0
Barbados	465.0	28.8	40.0	-16.7	107.0	122.9	612.0	33.9
Belize	98.8	4.1	11.7	11.4	11.0	-15.4	121.5	2.6
Grenada	53.2	10.4	1.4	-48.1	2.2	37.5	56.8	8.2
Guyana	808.0	9.3	88.0	11.4	344.0	18.6	1240.0	11.9
Jamaica	3174.0	5.6	678.0	-2.2	147.0	-13.0	3999.0	3.4
St.Vin.&Gren.	28.8	24.1	0.0	-100.0	3.0	50.0	31.8	24.7
Trin.&Tob.	1585.0	22.0	0.0	ERR	273.0	83.2	1858.0	28.3
TOTAL	6414.9	11.4	819.1	-1.7	937.2	33.6	8171.2	12.1
% of TOTAL	78.5		10.0		11.5			

Country	1987							
	LTD	Annual % Change	IMF Credit	Annual % Change	STD	Annual % Change	EDT	Annual % Change
Bahamas	174.7	-13.6	0.0	ERR	58.0	16.0	232.7	-7.7
Barbados	501.0	7.7	22.0	-45.0	98.0	-8.4	621.0	1.5
Belize	113.0	14.4	11.4	-2.6	14.0	27.3	138.4	13.9
Grenada	66.8	25.6	1.2	-14.3	3.7	68.2	71.7	26.2
Guyana	874.0	8.2	102.0	15.9	309.0	-10.2	1285.0	3.6
Jamaica	3569.0	12.4	678.0	0.0	199.0	35.4	4446.0	11.2
St.Vin.&Gren.	36.0	25.0	0.0	ERR	3.0	0.0	39.0	22.6
Trin.&Tob.	1635.0	3.2	0.0	ERR	166.0	-39.2	1801.0	-3.1
TOTAL	6969.5	8.6	814.6	-0.5	850.7	-9.2	8634.8	5.7
% of TOTAL	80.7		9.4		9.9			

Country	% Change 1983-1987			
	LTD	IMF Credit	STD	EDT
Bahamas	-26.2	ERR	114.8	-11.8
Barbados	71.0	-40.5	-60.6	7.3
Belize	49.7	200.0	-33.3	38.0
Grenada	48.4	-78.9	48.0	34.8
Guyana	25.8	32.5	55.3	32.3
Jamaica	46.5	8.1	-20.4	34.2
St.Vin.&Gren.	67.4	-100.0	200.0	61.8
Trin.&Tob.	59.4	ERR	-59.7	25.2
TOTAL	44.3	8.3	-26.8	28.1

Table 2

## External Debt of Selected CARICOM Countries 1983-1987 (US\$ Million)

	-----LTD-----			-----IMF Credit-----			-----STD-----			-----ETD-----	
	US\$ (Millions)	% of Total	% Change	US\$ (Millions)	% of Total	% Change	US\$ (Millions)	% of Total	% Change	US\$ (Millions)	% Change
Bahamas											
1983	236.7	89.8	-	0.0	0.0	-	27.0	10.2	-	263.7	-
1984	206.7	91.2	-12.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	8.8	-25.9	226.7	-14.0
1985	186.5	86.5	-9.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	29.0	13.5	45.0	215.5	-4.9
1986	202.1	80.2	8.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	19.8	72.4	252.1	17.0
1987	174.7	75.1	-13.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	58.0	24.9	16.0	232.7	-7.7
1983-1987			-26.2			0.0			114.8		-11.8
Barbados											
1983	293.0	50.6	-	37.0	6.4	-	249.0	43.0	-	579.0	-
1984	305.0	78.2	4.1	43.0	11.0	16.2	42.0	10.8	-83.1	390.0	-32.6
1985	361.0	79.0	18.4	48.0	10.5	11.6	48.0	10.5	14.3	457.0	17.2
1986	465.0	76.0	28.8	40.0	6.5	-16.7	107.0	17.5	122.9	612.0	33.9
1987	501.0	80.7	7.7	22.0	3.5	-45.0	98.0	15.8	-8.4	621.0	1.5
1983-1987			71.0			-40.5			-60.6		7.3
Belize											
1983	75.5	75.3	-	3.8	3.8	-	21.0	20.9	-	100.3	-
1984	75.8	78.5	0.4	4.7	4.9	23.7	16.0	16.6	-23.8	96.5	-3.8
1985	94.9	80.2	25.2	10.5	8.9	123.4	13.0	11.0	-18.8	118.4	22.7
1986	98.8	81.3	4.1	11.7	9.6	11.4	11.0	9.1	-15.4	121.5	2.6
1987	113.0	81.6	14.4	11.4	8.2	-2.6	14.0	10.1	27.3	138.4	13.9
1983-1987			49.7			200.0			-33.3		38.0
Grenada											
1983	45.0	84.6	-	5.7	10.7	-	2.5	4.7	-	53.2	-
1984	43.8	87.4	-2.7	4.5	9.0	-21.1	1.8	3.6	-28.0	50.1	-5.8
1985	48.2	91.8	10.0	2.7	5.1	-40.0	1.6	3.0	-11.1	52.5	4.8
1986	53.2	93.7	10.4	1.4	2.5	-48.1	2.2	3.9	37.5	56.8	8.2
1987	66.8	93.2	25.6	1.2	1.7	-14.3	3.7	5.2	68.2	71.7	26.2
1983-1987			48.4			-78.9			48.0		34.8
Guyana											
1983	695.0	71.6	-	77.0	7.9	-	199.0	20.5	-	971.0	-
1984	679.0	69.5	-2.3	71.0	7.3	-7.8	227.0	23.2	14.1	977.0	0.6
1985	739.0	66.7	8.8	79.0	7.1	11.3	290.0	26.2	27.8	1108.0	13.4
1986	808.0	65.2	9.3	88.0	7.1	11.4	344.0	27.7	18.6	1240.0	11.9
1987	874.0	68.0	8.2	102.0	7.9	15.9	309.0	24.0	-10.2	1285.0	3.6
1983-1987			25.8			32.5			55.3		32.3

Table 2 (Contd.)

Jamaica	LTD			IMF Credit			STD			ETD	
	US\$ (Millions)	% of Total	% Change	US\$ (Millions)	% of Total	% Change	US\$ (Millions)	% of Total	% Change	US\$ (Millions)	% Change
1983	2436.0	73.5	-	627.0	18.9	-	250.0	7.5	-	3313.0	-
1984	2592.0	75.2	6.4	629.0	18.3	0.3	224.0	6.5	-10.4	3445.0	4.0
1985	3005.0	77.7	15.9	693.0	17.9	10.2	169.0	4.4	-24.6	3867.0	12.2
1986	3174.0	79.4	5.6	678.0	17.0	-2.2	147.0	3.7	-13.0	3999.0	3.4
1987	3569.0	80.3	12.4	678.0	15.2	0.0	199.0	4.5	35.4	4446.0	11.2
1983-1987			46.5			8.1			-20.4		34.2
St. Vincent & Grenadines	LTD			IMF Credit			STD			ETD	
	US\$ (Millions)	% of Total	% Change	US\$ (Millions)	% of Total	% Change	US\$ (Millions)	% of Total	% Change	US\$ (Millions)	% Change
1983	21.5	89.2	-	1.6	6.6	-	1.0	4.1	-	24.1	-
1984	21.4	91.5	-0.5	1.0	4.3	-37.5	1.0	4.3	0.0	23.4	-2.9
1985	23.2	91.0	8.4	0.3	1.2	-70.0	2.0	7.8	100.0	25.5	9.0
1986	28.8	90.6	24.1	0.0	0.0	-100.0	3.0	9.4	50.0	31.8	24.7
1987	36.0	92.3	25.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	7.7	0.0	39.0	22.6
1983-1987			67.4			-100.0			200.0		61.8
Trinidad & Tobago	LTD			IMF Credit			STD			ETD	
	US\$ (Millions)	% of Total	% Change	US\$ (Millions)	% of Total	% Change	US\$ (Millions)	% of Total	% Change	US\$ (Millions)	% Change
1983	1026.0	71.3	-	0.0	0.0	-	412.0	28.7	-	1438.0	-
1984	1063.0	87.0	3.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	159.0	13.0	-61.4	1222.0	-15.0
1985	1299.0	89.7	22.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	149.0	10.3	-6.3	1448.0	18.5
1986	1585.0	85.3	22.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	273.0	14.7	83.2	1858.0	28.3
1987	1635.0	90.8	3.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	166.0	9.2	-39.2	1801.0	-3.1
1983-1987			59.4			0.0			-59.7		25.2
Total	LTD			IMF Credit			STD			ETD	
	US\$ (Millions)	% of Total	% Change	US\$ (Millions)	% of Total	% Change	US\$ (Millions)	% of Total	% Change	US\$ (Millions)	% Change
1983	4828.7	71.6	-	752.1	11.2	-	1161.5	17.2	-	6742.3	-
1984	4986.7	77.5	3.3	753.2	11.7	0.1	690.8	10.7	-40.5	6430.7	-4.6
1985	5756.8	78.9	15.4	833.5	11.4	10.7	701.6	9.6	1.6	7291.9	13.4
1986	6414.9	78.5	11.4	819.1	10.0	-1.7	937.2	11.5	33.6	8171.2	12.1
1987	6969.5	80.7	8.6	814.6	9.4	-0.5	850.7	9.9	-9.2	8634.8	5.7
1983-1987			44.3			8.3			-26.8		28.1

SOURCE: WORLD DEBT TABLES: 1988-89 EDITION



Table 3

Public & Publicly Guaranteed L.T. Debt by Source  
for Selected CARICOM Countries 1983-87

-----Bahamas-----					
	Total	Official	% of Total	Fin.Institutions	% of Total
1983	252.1	39.3	15.6	212.8	84.4
1984	225.0	35.1	15.6	189.9	84.4
1985	199.7	33.5	16.8	166.2	83.2
1986	229.8	54.4	23.7	175.4	76.3
1987	219.3	76.9	35.1	142.4	64.9
-----Barbados-----					
	Total	Official	% of Total	Fin.Institutions	% of Total
1983	385.0	220.0	57.1	165.0	42.9
1984	423.0	264.0	62.4	159.0	37.6
1985	460.0	268.0	58.3	192.0	41.7
1986	549.0	282.0	51.4	267.0	48.6
1987	650.0	326.0	50.2	324.0	49.8
-----Belize-----					
	Total	Official	% of Total	Fin.Institutions	% of Total
1983	102.3	83.9	82.0	18.4	18.0
1984	99.6	81.1	81.4	18.5	18.6
1985	128.7	111.4	86.6	17.3	13.4
1986	127.8	114.6	89.7	13.2	10.3
1987	147.7	132.9	90.0	14.8	10.0
-----Grenada-----					
	Total	Official	% of Total	Fin.Institutions	% of Total
1983	51.2	46.5	90.8	4.7	9.2
1984	51.3	47.5	92.6	3.8	7.4
1985	78.1	74.5	95.4	3.6	4.6
1986	79.6	76.5	96.1	3.1	3.9
1987	89.9	87.2	97.0	2.7	3.0
-----Guyana-----					
	Total	Official	% of Total	Fin.Institutions	% of Total
1983	821.0	642.0	78.2	179.0	21.8
1984	839.0	643.0	76.6	196.0	23.4
1985	942.0	747.0	79.3	195.0	20.7
1986	973.0	770.0	79.1	203.0	20.9
1987	1038.0	833.0	80.3	205.0	19.7
-----Jamaica-----					
	Total	Official	% of Total	Fin.Institutions	% of Total
1983	2867.0	2367.0	82.6	500.0	17.4
1984	3252.0	2725.0	83.8	527.0	16.2
1985	3424.0	2869.0	83.8	555.0	16.2
1986	3564.0	3026.0	84.9	538.0	15.1
1987	4048.0	3463.0	85.5	585.0	14.5

Table 3 (Contd.)

-----St. Vincent & Grenadines-----					
	Total	Official	% of Total	Fin. Institutions	% of Total
1983	28.8	28.0	97.2	0.8	2.8
1984	48.2	47.6	98.8	0.6	1.2
1985	50.1	49.6	99.0	0.5	1.0
1986	50.6	50.2	99.2	0.4	0.8
1987	59.9	59.6	99.5	0.3	0.5
-----Trinidad & Tobago-----					
	Total	Official	% of Total	Fin. Institutions	% of Total
1983	1354.0	493.0	36.4	861.0	63.6
1984	1436.0	494.0	34.4	942.0	65.6
1985	1727.0	528.0	30.6	1199.0	69.4
1986	1815.0	538.0	29.6	1277.0	70.4
1987	1860.0	496.0	26.7	1364.0	73.3
-----Total-----					
	Total	Official	% of Total	Fin. Institutions	% of Total
1983	5861.4	3919.7	66.9	1941.7	33.1
1984	6374.1	4337.3	68.0	2036.8	32.0
1985	7009.6	4681.0	66.8	2328.6	33.2
1986	7388.8	4911.7	66.5	2477.1	33.5
1987	8112.8	5474.6	67.5	2638.2	32.5

Table 4(a)

GNP-Based  
Selected Economic Indicators for Selected CARICOM Countries 1983-87

Bahamas						Exchange Rate
	GNP	XGS	MGS	% LTD/GNP	% EDT/GNP	(Local Cur./US\$)
1983	1009.5	1262.0	1306.2	14.7	16.4	1.00
1984	1022.6	1326.1	1376.8	10.9	12.0	1.00
1985	2138.1	1542.0	1580.7	8.6	10.0	1.00
1986	2009.2	1614.5	1633.2	8.8	10.9	1.00
1987	2101.9	-	-	6.8	9.1	-
Barbados						Exchange Rate
	GNP	XGS	MGS	% LTD/GNP	% EDT/GNP	(Local Cur./US\$)
1983	1035.0	698.0	761.0	28.3	55.9	2.00
1984	1134.0	827.0	823.0	26.9	34.4	2.00
1985	1121.0	797.0	762.0	30.3	38.4	2.00
1986	1001.0	769.0	786.0	35.7	47.0	2.00
1987	1008.0	-	-	37.2	46.1	-
Belize						Exchange Rate
	GNP	XGS	MGS	% LTD/GNP	% EDT/GNP	(Local Cur./US\$)
1983	106.6	-	-	45.3	60.2	2.00
1984	128.0	127.0	159.8	42.6	54.2	2.00
1985	130.9	127.6	155.1	52.5	65.5	2.00
1986	127.5	131.2	160.1	50.0	61.5	2.00
1987	-	151.9	176.2	-	-	-
Grenada						Exchange Rate
	GNP	XGS	MGS	% LTD/GNP	% EDT/GNP	(Local Cur./US\$)
1983	43.9	40.6	80.3	47.9	56.7	2.70
1984	40.7	42.1	73.6	43.5	49.8	2.70
1985	43.7	52.9	91.4	42.4	46.2	2.70
1986	44.5	61.5	107.4	42.7	45.6	2.70
1987	44.6	-	-	49.6	53.3	-
Guyana						Exchange Rate
	GNP	XGS	MGS	% LTD/GNP	% EDT/GNP	(Local Cur./US\$)
1983	405.0	226.0	382.0	163.5	228.5	3.03
1984	332.0	246.0	346.0	192.9	277.6	3.83
1985	323.0	262.0	354.0	203.6	305.2	4.25
1986*	345.0	256.0	313.0	204.6	313.9	4.27
1987*	317.0	248.0	-	353.8	520.2	-
Jamaica						Exchange Rate
	GNP	XGS	MGS	% LTD/GNP	% EDT/GNP	(Local Cur./US\$)
1983	3137.0	1374.0	1789.0	77.7	105.6	1.93
1984	2114.0	1361.0	1788.0	120.9	160.7	3.94
1985	1732.0	1358.0	1789.0	172.5	222.0	5.55
1986	2117.0	1465.0	1598.0	147.8	186.3	5.48
1987	2538.0	1692.0	1916.0	141.2	175.9	-

Table 4(i) Contd.

-----St. Vincent & Grenadines-----						Exchange Rate
	GNP	XGS	MGS	% LTD/GNP	% EDT/GNP	(Local Cur./US\$)
1983	69.0	59.1	81.1	24.2	27.1	2.70
1984	77.0	72.7	89.2	22.1	24.1	2.70
1985	106.1	82.6	92.3	21.9	24.0	2.70
1986	133.9	87.5	100.5	25.3	27.9	2.70
1987	191.1	-	-	30.2	32.7	-
-----Trinidad & Tobago-----						Exchange Rate
	GNP	XGS	MGS	% LTD/GNP	% EDT/GNP	(Local Cur./US\$)
1983	783.0	2577.0	3498.0	13.1	18.3	2.40
1984	769.0	2581.0	3021.0	13.9	16.0	2.40
1985	722.0	2595.0	2626.0	17.6	19.6	2.45
1986	480.0	1734.0	2125.0	33.0	38.7	3.60
1987><	410.0	1406.0	-	39.3	43.3	-

Sources: \* International Financial Statistics for XGS and MGS  
 >< 1989 World Development Report for XGS

Table 5

Public & Publicly Guaranteed L.T. Debt by Source  
for Selected CARICOM Countries 1983-87

The Bahamas										
	Total	% Change	Multilat.	% Change	Bilateral	% Change	Suppliers	% Change	Financial	% Change
									Market	
1983	252.0	-	31.7	-	7.6	-	28.9	-	183.8	-
1984	224.9	-10.8	27.8	-12.3	7.3	-3.9	21.8	-24.6	168.0	-8.6
1985	199.7	-11.2	26.5	-4.7	7.1	-2.7	18.6	-14.7	147.5	-12.2
1986	229.7	15.0	47.5	79.2	6.9	-2.8	13.0	-30.1	162.3	10.0
1987	219.3	-4.5	71.0	49.5	5.9	-14.5	8.5	-34.6	133.9	-17.5
1983-87		-13.0		124.0		-22.4		-70.6		-27.1
Barbados										
	Total	% Change	Multilat.	% Change	Bilateral	% Change	Suppliers	% Change	Financial	% Change
									Market	
1983	386.0	-	141.0	-	80.0	-	2.0	-	163.0	-
1984	424.0	9.8	186.0	31.9	78.0	-2.5	4.0	100.0	156.0	-4.3
1985	460.0	8.5	193.0	3.8	75.0	-3.8	4.0	0.0	188.0	20.5
1986	549.0	19.3	212.0	9.8	70.0	-6.7	4.0	0.0	263.0	39.9
1987	651.0	18.6	245.0	15.6	81.0	15.7	5.0	25.0	320.0	21.7
1983-87		68.7		73.8		1.3		150.0		96.3
Belize										
	Total	% Change	Multilat.	% Change	Bilateral	% Change	Suppliers	% Change	Financial	% Change
									Market	
1983	102.4	-	47.5	-	36.5	-	13.4	-	5.0	-
1984	99.6	-2.7	39.9	-16.0	41.2	12.9	10.4	-22.4	8.1	62.0
1985	128.7	29.2	40.0	0.3	71.4	73.3	9.4	-9.6	7.9	-2.5
1986	128.0	-0.5	46.1	15.3	68.6	-3.9	6.2	-34.0	7.1	-10.1
1987	147.7	15.4	59.4	28.9	73.5	7.1	6.3	1.6	8.5	19.7
1983-87		44.2		25.1		101.4		-53.0		70.0
Grenada										
	Total	% Change	Multilat.	% Change	Bilateral	% Change	Suppliers	% Change	Financial	% Change
									Market	
1983	51.3	-	23.4	-	23.1	-	1.8	-	3.0	-
1984	51.3	0.0	25.4	8.5	22.1	-4.3	1.5	-16.7	2.3	-23.3
1985	78.1	52.2	35.7	40.6	38.8	75.6	1.5	0.0	2.1	-8.7
1986	79.6	1.9	37.4	4.8	39.1	0.8	1.4	-6.7	1.7	-19.0
1987	89.9	12.9	39.5	5.6	47.7	22.0	1.4	0.0	1.3	-23.5
1983-87		75.2		68.8		106.5		-22.2		-56.7
Guyana										
	Total	% Change	Multilat.	% Change	Bilateral	% Change	Suppliers	% Change	Financial	% Change
									Market	
1983	809.0	-	299.0	-	343.0	-	48.0	-	119.0	-
1984	797.0	-1.5	322.0	7.7	321.0	-6.4	37.0	-22.9	117.0	-1.7
1985	901.0	13.0	403.0	25.2	344.0	7.2	40.0	8.1	114.0	-2.6
1986	937.0	4.0	422.0	4.7	348.0	1.2	54.0	35.0	113.0	-0.9
1987	1005.0	7.3	461.0	9.2	372.0	6.9	56.0	3.7	116.0	2.7
1983-87		24.2		54.2		8.5		16.7		-2.5

Table 5 (Contd.)

Jamaica										
Total	% Change	Multilat.	% Change	Bilateral	% Change	Suppliers	% Change	Financial	% Change	Market
1983	2831.0	-	885.0	-	1482.0	-	51.0	-	416.0	-
1984	3227.0	13.9	975.0	10.2	1750.0	18.1	71.0	39.2	433.0	4.1
1985	3401.0	5.5	1034.0	6.1	1836.0	4.9	118.0	66.2	420.0	-3.0
1986	3557.0	4.2	1163.0	12.5	1863.0	1.5	112.0	-5.1	413.0	-1.7
1987	4037.0	13.7	1446.0	24.3	2017.0	8.3	164.0	46.4	410.0	-0.7
1983-87		42.4		63.4		36.1		221.6		-1.4
St. Vincent & The Grenadines										
Total	% Change	Multilat.	% Change	Bilateral	% Change	Suppliers	% Change	Financial	% Change	Market
1983	20.7	-	25.9	-	2.1	-	0.5	-	0.2	-
1984	40.1	67.6	37.2	43.6	10.4	395.2	0.3	-40.0	0.2	0.0
1985	57.0	4.0	37.6	1.1	11.9	14.4	0.3	0.0	0.2	0.0
1986	57.5	1.0	38.3	1.9	11.8	-0.8	0.2	-33.3	0.2	0.0
1987	57.9	18.6	47.6	24.3	12.0	1.7	0.1	-50.0	0.2	0.0
1983-87		108.7		83.8		471.4		-80.0		0.0
Trinidad & Tobago										
Total	% Change	Multilat.	% Change	Bilateral	% Change	Suppliers	% Change	Financial	% Change	Market
1983	1350.0	-	88.0	-	405.0	-	175.0	-	685.0	-
1984	1432.0	6.1	57.0	-35.2	437.0	7.9	163.0	-6.9	779.0	13.7
1985	1727.0	20.3	81.0	42.1	447.0	2.3	150.0	-8.0	1049.0	34.7
1986	1816.0	5.2	113.0	39.5	425.0	-4.9	136.0	-9.3	1142.0	8.9
1987	1859.0	2.4	119.0	5.3	377.0	-11.3	121.0	-11.0	1242.0	8.8
1983-87		37.4		35.2		-6.9		-30.9		81.3
Total of All Countries										
Total	% Change	Multilat.	% Change	Bilateral	% Change	Suppliers	% Change	Financial	% Change	Market
1983	5816.4	-	1541.5	-	2379.3	-	320.6	-	1575.0	-
1984	6309.9	8.5	1670.3	8.4	2667.0	12.1	309.0	-3.6	1663.6	5.6
1985	6952.5	10.2	1850.8	10.8	2831.2	6.2	341.8	10.6	1928.7	15.9
1986	7340.8	5.6	2079.3	12.3	2832.4	0.0	326.8	-4.4	2102.3	9.0
1987	8068.8	9.9	2488.5	19.7	2986.1	5.4	362.3	10.9	2231.9	6.2
1983-87		38.7		61.4		25.5		13.0		41.7

Table 6

Summary of Public and Publicly Guaranteed Long-Term Debt by Source for  
Selected Caricom Countries 1983-87

	Total	Multilateral	%	Bilateral	%	Suppliers Credit	%	Financial Markets	%
1983	5,816.3	1,541.5	26.5	2,379.2	40.9	320.6	5.5	1,575.0	27.1
1984	6,309.9	1,670.3	26.5	2,667.0	42.3	309.0	4.9	1,663.6	26.4
1985	6,952.5	1,850.8	26.6	2,831.2	40.7	341.8	4.9	1,928.7	27.7
1986	7,340.8	2,079.3	28.3	2,832.4	38.6	326.8	4.5	2,102.3	28.6
1987	8,068.8	2,488.5	30.8	2,986.1	37.0	362.3	4.5	2,231.9	27.7
% 1983- 87	38.7	61.4		25.5		13.0		41.7	

Table 7

## Financial Flows for Selected CARICOM Countries 1983-1987 (US\$ Millions)

	Principal Repayments	% Change	Net Flows	Interest Repayments	% Change	Net Transfers	% Change	Total Debt Service	TDS as % of XGS	TDS as % of GNP
Bahamas										
1983	17.2	-	6.2	27.0	-	-20.8	-	44.2	3.5	2.7
1984	29.2	69.8	-27.4	25.9	-4.1	-53.3	156.2	55.1	4.2	2.9
1985	30.8	5.5	-24.7	20.1	-22.4	-44.8	-15.9	50.9	3.3	2.4
1986	21.1	-31.5	12.2	21.8	8.5	-9.6	-78.6	42.9	2.7	1.9
1987	36.1	71.1	-31.9	13.6	-37.6	-45.5	374.0	49.7	-	1.9
1983-87		109.9			-49.6		118.8			
Barbados										
	Principal Repayments	% Change	Net Flows	Interest Repayments	% Change	Net Transfers	% Change	Total Debt Service	TDS as % of XGS	TDS as % of GNP
1983	11.0	-	69.0	17.0	-	52.0	-	28.0	4.0	2.7
1984	13.0	18.2	26.0	15.0	-11.8	11.0	-78.8	28.0	3.4	2.5
1985	24.0	84.6	48.0	20.0	33.3	28.0	154.5	44.0	5.5	3.7
1986	26.0	8.3	88.0	31.0	55.0	57.0	103.6	57.0	7.4	4.4
1987	38.0	46.2	-8.0	32.0	3.2	-40.0	-170.2	70.0	-	5.2
1983-87		245.5			88.2		-176.9			
Belize										
	Principal Repayments	% Change	Net Flows	Interest Repayments	% Change	Net Transfers	% Change	Total Debt Service	TDS as % of XGS	TDS as % of GNP
1983	2.7	-	16.1	2.3	-	13.8	-	5.0	-	3.0
1984	2.1	-22.2	6.3	3.0	30.4	3.3	-76.1	5.1	4.0	2.9
1985	9.2	338.1	13.1	5.7	90.0	7.4	124.2	14.9	11.7	8.2
1986	7.9	-14.1	0.8	4.5	-21.1	-3.7	-150.0	12.4	9.5	6.3
1987	7.1	-10.1	5.0	4.0	-11.1	1.0	-127.0	11.1	7.3	-
1983-87		163.0			73.9		-92.8			
Grenada										
	Principal Repayments	% Change	Net Flows	Interest Repayments	% Change	Net Transfers	% Change	Total Debt Service	TDS as % of XGS	TDS as % of GNP
1983	3.0	-	13.2	0.8	-	12.4	-	3.8	9.4	4.0
1984	2.1	-30.0	2.6	1.1	37.5	1.5	-87.9	3.2	7.6	3.2
1985	2.1	0.0	0.8	1.1	0.0	-0.3	-120.0	3.2	6.0	2.8
1986	3.0	42.9	3.5	1.0	-9.1	2.5	-933.3	4.0	6.5	3.2
1987	3.7	23.3	7.2	1.8	80.0	5.4	116.0	5.5	-	4.1
1983-87		23.3			125.0		-56.5			
Guyana										
	Principal Repayments	% Change	Net Flows	Interest Repayments	% Change	Net Transfers	% Change	Total Debt Service	TDS as % of XGS	TDS as % of GNP
1983	23.0	-	34.0	28.0	-	6.0	-	51.0	22.6	12.0
1984	15.0	-34.8	10.0	21.0	-25.0	-11.0	-283.3	36.0	14.6	10.2
1985	11.0	-26.7	32.0	13.0	-38.1	19.0	-272.7	24.0	9.2	6.6
1986	16.0	45.5	40.0	16.0	23.1	24.0	26.3	32.0	12.5	8.1
1987	9.0	-43.8	12.0	16.0	0.0	-4.0	-116.7	25.0	10.1	10.1
1983-87		-60.9			-42.9		-166.7			



Table 7(Contd.)

	Principal Repayments	% Change	Net Flows	Interest Repayments	% Change	Net Transfers	% Change	Total Debt Service	TDS as % of XGS	TDS as % of GNP
1983	113.0	-	262.0	151.0	-	111.0	-	264.0	19.2	8.4
1984	76.0	-32.7	282.0	185.0	22.5	97.0	-12.6	261.0	19.2	12.2
1985	186.0	144.7	226.0	209.0	13.0	17.0	-82.5	395.0	29.1	22.7
1986	220.0	18.3	-1.0	215.0	2.9	-216.0	-1370.6	435.0	29.7	20.3
1987	211.0	-4.1	101.0	226.0	5.1	-125.0	-42.1	437.0	25.8	17.3
1983-87		86.7			49.7		-212.6			
St. Vincent & The Grenadines										
	Principal Repayments	% Change	Net Flows	Interest Repayments	% Change	Net Transfers	% Change	Total Debt Service	TDS as % of XGS	TDS as % of GNP
1983	0.7	-	3.0	0.6	-	2.4	-	1.3	2.2	1.5
1984	0.7	0.0	1.1	1.1	83.3	0.0	-100.0	1.8	2.5	1.9
1985	1.2	71.4	1.5	1.2	9.1	0.3	>>>	2.4	2.9	2.3
1986	1.4	16.7	5.5	1.3	8.3	4.2	1300.0	2.7	3.1	2.4
1987	1.6	14.3	5.9	1.3	0.0	4.6	9.5	2.9	-	2.4
1983-87		128.6			116.7		91.7			
Trinidad & Tobago										
	Principal Repayments	% Change	Net Flows	Interest Repayments	% Change	Net Transfers	% Change	Total Debt Service	TDS as % of XGS	TDS as % of GNP
1983	151.0	-	129.0	122.0	-	7.0	-	273.0	10.6	3.5
1984	110.0	-27.2	66.0	75.0	-38.5	-9.0	-228.6	185.0	7.2	2.4
1985	155.0	40.9	144.0	96.0	28.0	48.0	-633.3	251.0	9.7	3.4
1986	191.0	23.2	156.0	118.0	22.9	38.0	-20.8	309.0	17.8	6.4
1987	263.0	37.7	-134.0	121.0	2.5	-255.0	-771.1	384.0	27.3	9.2
1983-87		74.2			-0.8		-3742.9			
Total of All Countries										
	Principal Repayments	% Change	Net Flows	Interest Repayments	% Change	Net Transfers	% Change	Total Debt Service	TDS as % of XGS	TDS as % of GNP
1983	321.6	-	532.5	348.7	-	183.8	-	670.3	10.7	4.7
1984	248.1	-22.9	366.6	327.1	-6.2	39.5	-78.5	575.2	8.7	4.2
1985	419.3	69.0	440.7	366.1	11.9	74.6	88.9	785.4	11.5	5.9
1986	486.4	16.0	305.0	408.6	11.6	-103.6	-238.9	895.0	14.6	7.9
1987	569.5	17.1	-42.8	415.7	1.7	-458.5	342.6	985.2	28.2	8.9
1983-87		77.1			19.2		-349.5			

Table 8

Debt Service to GNP (%) for Selected Groups of Debtor Countries

	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
<u>All Developing Countries a</u> TDS/GNP	3.6	3.8	4.4	4.5	
<u>Sub-Saharan Africa a</u> TDS/GNP	3.3	4.2	5.0	4.3	
<u>Highly Indebted Countries a</u> TDS/GNP	4.7	4.8	5.2	4.9	
<u>Low Income Africa a</u>	2.5	3.2	3.5	3.9	
<u>Caricom Countries b</u> TDS/GNP	4.7	4.2	5.9	7.9	8.9

Source: For a Commonwealth Secretariat Debt Distress: A Problem for Low Income Countries.

For b Calculated from World Debt Tables.

Table 9

Comparative Debt Service to XGS Ratios

	Jamaica	Guyana	Trinidad & Tobago	All Caricom	15 Heavily Indebted Countries	Low Income African Countries
1983	19.2	22.6	10.6	10.7	41.8	20.8
1984	19.2	14.6	7.2	8.7	41.7	26.9
1985	29.1	9.2	9.7	11.5	40.7	31.1
1986	29.7	12.5	17.8	14.6	45.3	27.5
1987	25.8	10.1	27.3	28.2	35.0	26.8

Source: Caricom countries calculated from data in World Debt Tables. Heavily Indebted Countries and Low Income African Countries, from IMF World Economic Outlook, 1989.

Table 10

## Inter-Temporal and Inter-Country Comparison of Average Terms on New Commitments 1983-1987

All Creditors	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
<u>Interest %</u>					
The Bahamas	7.7	10.7	ERR	8.4	4.1
Barbados	9.0	8.5	8.8	7.5	8.3
Belize	7.6	3.8	3.6	9.1	6.7
Grenada	5.3	2.4	1.1	4.0	1.4
Guyana	6.2	8.3	5.9	6.5	2.0
Jamaica	7.7	7.3	8.0	6.7	6.8
St Vin. & the Gre.	4.2	2.6	4.8	4.2	2.8
Trinidad & Tobago	11.1	11.0	8.5	6.9	6.8
<u>Maturity (years)</u>					
The Bahamas	17.0	8.5	ERR	11.5	14.5
Barbados	16.1	20.7	7.7	7.9	12.1
Belize	18.4	23.3	19.5	16.5	13.8
Grenada	13.2	20.6	34.4	20.2	25.5
Guyana	33.7	19.2	27.7	7.1	27.1
Jamaica	18.9	17.6	11.2	15.8	15.0
St Vin. & the Gre.	26.9	32.9	15.5	19.3	31.9
Trinidad & Tobago	8.4	8.3	7.4	9.9	7.1
<u>Grace Period (years)</u>					
The Bahamas	4.0	2.0	ERR	2.3	2.8
Barbados	4.0	4.3	4.7	4.0	2.8
Belize	6.5	7.2	6.7	4.4	3.6
Grenada	4.1	5.6	7.4	4.9	8.7
Guyana	7.5	3.8	6.0	1.0	7.8
Jamaica	5.8	5.1	3.6	4.2	3.0
St Vin. & the Gre.	5.2	8.0	3.1	4.6	7.6
Trinidad & Tobago	3.2	4.1	3.9	2.2	4.0
<u>Grant Element 1.</u>					
The Bahamas	12.8	-3.7	ERR	7.2	31.2
Barbados	6.6	11.8	5.0	9.2	6.3
Belize	17.7	49.6	46.6	4.9	17.9
Grenada	26.1	48.1	71.7	39.2	65.3
Guyana	45.9	6.3	30.3	10.7	60.0
Jamaica	18.0	19.7	13.8	21.1	16.5
St Vin. & the Gre.	42.5	57.9	28.5	36.9	56.8
Trinidad & Tobago	-5.3	-4.1	6.0	11.5	13.1

Table 11

## Inter-Temporal and Inter-Country Comparison of Average Terms on New Public and Private Commitments

Creditors	1983		1984		1985		1986		1987	
	Official	Private	Official	Private	Official	Private	Official	Private	Official	Private
<u>Interest %</u>										
The Bahamas	7.7	ERR	ERR	10.7	ERR	ERR	7.7	8.9	4.1	ERR
Barbados	8.1	10.8	8.3	11.8	7.9	8.9	9.4	6.9	8.1	8.5
Belize	7.6	ERR	0.3	13.2	2.9	12.7	8.7	15.0	5.7	9.9
Grenada	4.0	12.7	2.4	ERR	1.1	ERR	4.0	ERR	1.4	ERR
Guyana	ERR	17.7	9.5	6.1	5.9	17.6	4.7	7.0	2.0	ERR
Jamaica	7.4	11.0	6.8	11.1	7.0	10.0	6.1	8.1	6.6	7.3
St Vin. & the Gre.	4.2	7.9	2.6	ERR	4.8	ERR	4.2	ERR	2.8	ERR
Trinidad & Tobago	11.2	11.1	10.0	11.3	8.4	8.5	6.0	7.5	ERR	6.8
<u>Maturity (years)</u>										
The Bahamas	17.0	ERR	ERR	8.5	ERR	ERR	16.1	8.0	14.8	ERR
Barbados	21.1	6.0	22.0	5.1	18.6	6.2	15.9	5.6	18.1	6.8
Belize	18.4	ERR	24.6	13.2	20.3	12.7	16.9	15.0	15.3	9.9
Grenada	14.7	6.7	20.6	ERR	34.4	ERR	20.2	ERR	25.5	ERR
Guyana	47.3	8.6	24.2	9.7	27.8	4.5	11.6	5.7	27.1	ERR
Jamaica	20.1	5.5	19.0	6.5	15.7	2.1	19.6	6.1	20.0	2.3
St Vin. & the Gre.	26.9	9.6	32.9	ERR	15.5	ERR	19.3	ERR	31.9	ERR
Trinidad & Tobago	11.5	6.7	10.2	7.6	10.8	6.5	16.2	6.2	ERR	7.1
<u>Grace Period (years)</u>										
The Bahamas	4.0	ERR	ERR	2.0	ERR	ERR	4.1	1.0	2.8	ERR
Barbados	5.3	1.4	4.6	0.6	5.6	4.5	3.7	4.1	4.4	1.4
Belize	6.5	ERR	7.3	7.0	7.0	2.7	4.4	3.4	4.2	1.6
Grenada	4.5	1.7	5.6	ERR	7.4	ERR	4.9	ERR	8.7	ERR
Guyana	9.9	3.1	4.5	2.4	6.0	1.5	1.0	1.0	7.8	ERR
Jamaica	6.1	1.4	5.7	0.8	5.0	0.8	5.5	0.8	3.9	0.7
St Vin. & the Gre.	5.2	9.6	8.0	ERR	3.1	ERR	4.6	ERR	7.6	ERR
Trinidad & Tobago	2.3	3.7	3.8	4.2	3.5	4.0	3.6	1.4	ERR	4.0
<u>Grant Element 1.</u>										
The Bahamas	12.8	ERR	ERR	-3.7	ERR	ERR	13.1	2.8	31.2	ERR
Barbados	11.5	-3.3	13.1	-4.7	13.5	3.7	2.1	11.2	9.0	3.9
Belize	17.7	ERR	73.1	-14.4	50.5	-11.0	6.5	-22.9	23.8	-1.1
Grenada	32.2	-9.8	48.1	ERR	71.7	ERR	39.2	ERR	65.3	ERR
Guyana	89.1	-34.0	1.0	16.0	30.7	-18.6	20.4	7.9	60.0	ERR
Jamaica	19.9	-3.4	22.9	-6.4	20.8	-0.4	27.4	5.3	21.9	3.0
St Vin. & the Gre.	42.6	11.9	57.9	ERR	28.5	ERR	36.9	ERR	56.8	ERR
Trinidad & Tobago	-6.1	-4.8	-1.1	-5.2	8.7	5.4	19.5	6.9	ERR	13.1

TABLE 12

Belize : Analysis of Interest Rates of Government Loan Commitments, 1983-1987.  
(percentage)

	<u>a/</u>				
	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>
<u>Fixed Interest Rates</u>					
Multilateral and Bilateral Creditors					
rate < 5%	34.3		44.8		81.0
rates = > 5%	36.4		14.7	100	
Commercial Banks					
<u>Variable Interest Rates</u>					
Multilateral and Bilateral Creditors	27.7	52.5			
Commercial Banks					
Margin					

Source: Belize CS - DRMS

a/ Percentages do not necessarily add up as the data does not allow the identification of the interest on every loan.

TABLE 13

Guyana: Analysis of Interest Rates of Government Loan Commitments, 1983 - 1987  
(percentage)

	<u>1983</u>	<u>a/</u> <u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>
<u>Fixed Interest Rates</u>					
Multilateral and Bilateral Creditors					
rate < 5%	-	5.0	46.9	100.0	92.7
rate => 5%	-	95.0	53.1		7.3
Commercial Banks	-				
<u>Variable Interest Rates</u>					
Multilateral and Bilateral Creditors	-				
Commercial Banks	-				
Interest on rescheduled commercial loans	-	LIBOR + 2 1/4%	LIBOR + 2 1/2%	-	LIBOR + 2 1/2%

Source: Guyana CS - DRMS

a/ Percentage of the Fixed Interest Loans

TABLE 14

Jamaica: Analysis of Interest Rate of Government Loan Commitments<sup>\*</sup>, 1983-1987  
(percentage)

	<u>a/</u>				
	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>
<u>Fixed Interest Rates</u>					
Multilateral and Bilateral Creditors					
rate < 5%	30.6	30.6	5.9	9.4	6.2
rate = > 5%	40.6	20.8	16.1	69.6	23.3
Commercial Banks	0.3	0.2			
<u>Variable Interest Rates</u>					
Multilateral and Bilateral Creditors	20.4	39.8	16.8	17.9	30.5
Commercial Banks <sup>*</sup>	0.4	3.4	16.1		36.5
with margins:	2 1/4%	2 1/4-2 3/8	2 1/2 +		1 1/4% +
	+ LIBOR	+ LIBOR	LIBOR		LIBOR

\* Includes rescheduled debt

a/ Percentages do not necessarily add up

Source : Jamaica CS - DRMS



Table 15  
BELIZE: GOVERNMENT LOAN COMMITMENTS BY CREDITOR, 1983-87  
 (in million Belize dollars)

NEW LOAN COMMITMENTS	1983	Percentage of of ca- Total tegory		1984	Percentage of of ca- Total tegory		1985	Percentage of of ca- Total tegory		1986	Percentage of of ca- Total tegory		1987	Percentage of of ca- Total tegory	
<u>MULTILATERAL</u>															
CDB	0.1	0.3	0.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.7	81.0	100.0
ECCB	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.4	0.6	100.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
EIB	1.0	2.6	5.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
IBRD	10.6	27.7	54.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	15.0	100.0	100.0	-	-	-
IMF	7.5	19.6	38.9	14.0	40.8	100.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sub-total	19.3	50.5		14.0	40.8	100.0	0.4	0.6	100.0	15.0	100.0	100.0	4.7	81.0	100.0
<u>BILATERAL</u>															
Barbados	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.0	1.5	1.6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mexico	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.8	7.4	7.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
United Kingdom	6.4	16.8	34.8	13.8	40.2	77.5	21.4	33.1	33.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
United States	12.0	31.4	65.2	4.0	11.7	22.5	29.0	44.8	45.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Venezuela	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.1	12/5	12/6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sub-total	18.4	48.2	100.0	17.8	51.9	100.0	64.3	99.4	100.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Commercial Banks	-	-	-	2.5	7.3	100.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Suppliers' credits	0.6	1.6	100.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.1	19.0	100.0
TOTAL	38.			34.3			64.7			15.0			5.8		

Source: Belize CS-DRMS

Table 16  
GUYANA: GOVERNMENT COMMITMENTS BY CREDITOR, 1983-87  
(in million Guyana dollars)

NEW LOAN COMMITMENTS	1983	Percentage of of ca- Total tegory		1984	Percentage of of ca- Total tegory		1985	Percentage of of ca- Total tegory		1986	Percentage of of ca- Total tegory		1987	Percentage of of ca- Total tegory	
<u>MULTILATERAL</u>															
IDA	-			-			40.12	11.1	10.1	-			-		
IADB	-			152.63	67.1	93.1	192.06	77.1	77.1	-			67.50	35.4	100.0
IFAD	-			-			-			23.06	57.5	84.3	-		
OPEC	-			11.25	5.0	6.9	13.35	5.4	5.4	4.30	10.7	15.7	-		
EEC	-			-			3.75	1.5	1.5	-			-		
Sub-total				163.88	72.1	100.0	249.28	100.0	100.0	27.36	68.0	100.0	67.50	35.4	100.0
<u>BILATERAL</u>															
CIDA	42.00	91.8	91.8	-			-			-			-		
USDA	-			-			-			12.90	32.0	100.0	84.00	44.0	68.1
Barbados	-			-			-			-			12.00	6.3	9.7
USSR	-			63.46	27.9	100.0	-			-			-		
China (PRC)	-			-			-			-			27.40	14.3	22.2
Korea (DPRK)	3.76	8.2	8.2	-			-			-			-		
Sub-total	45.76	100.0	100.0	63.46	27.9	100.0	-			12.90	32.0	100.0	123.40	64.6	100.0
Total new commitments	45.76			227.34			249.28			40.26			190.90		
Nationalisation	-			137.28			-			-			-		
Debt rescheduling	-			41.90			573.28			-			646.27		

Source: Guyana CS-DRMS

JAMAICA: LOAN COMMITMENTS\* BY CREDITOR, 1983-1987  
(in millions Jamaica dollars)

New Loan Commitments	1983		1984		1985		1986		1987		1987				
	Total	Percentage of Category	Total	Percentage of Category	Total	Percentage of Category	Total	Percentage of Category	Total	Percentage of Category	Total	Percentage of Category			
<u>MULTILATERAL</u>															
CDB	19.0	2.0	4.0	28.5	1.1	3.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
EEC	-	-	-	7.0	0.3	0.8	-	-	-	5.7	0.8	1.8	-	-	
IBRD	161.0	16.9	33.5	368.5	14.6	41.6	49.3	1.5	11.7	-	-	-	571.0	10.1	40.3
IDA	52.2	5.5	10.9	137.6	5.5	15.5	88.8	2.6	21.0	152.3	20.3	46.9	171.0	3.0	12.1
IMF	247.6	26.1	51.6	346.6	13.7	39.0	285.3	8.4	67.4	166.6	22.2	51.3	673.6	12.0	47.6
Sub-total	479.8	50.5	100.0	888.2	35.2	100.0	423.4	12.5	100.0	324.6	43.3	100.0	1415.6	25.1	100.0
<u>BILATERAL</u>															
Belgium	1.7	0.2	0.4	0.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.7	0.1	0.1
Canada	39.2	4.1	8.5	46.5	1.8	3.0	47.3	1.4	5.3	-	-	-	52.2	0.9	2.4
France	20.4	2.1	4.4	25.0	1.0	1.6	7.6	0.2	0.9	-	-	-	7.9	0.1	0.4
FRG	11.0	1.2	2.4	6.9	0.3	0.4	38.0	1.1	4.3	5.4	0.7	1.3	59.0	1.1	2.8
Iraq	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	32.3	0.6	1.5
Italy	9.3	1.0	2.0	6.4	0.3	0.4	-	-	-	10.5	1.3	2.6	-	-	-
Japan	78.5	8.3	17.1	83.6	3.3	5.4	1.2	0.0	0.1	-	-	-	1.3	0.0	0.6
Libya	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	230.2	30.7	56.3	-	-	-
Mexico	31.2	3.3	6.8	128.5	5.1	8.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	343.4	6.1	16.0
Netherlands	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.0	0.2	0.8	-	-	-	57.5	1.0	2.7
Norway	-	-	-	-	-	-	16.2	0.3	1.8	11.7	1.6	2.9	-	-	-
Saudi Arabia	-	-	-	15.7	0.6	1.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Trinidad and Tobago	4.6	0.5	1.0	8.2	0.3	0.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
United Kingdom	12.6	1.3	2.7	42.2	1.7	2.7	50.2	1.5	5.6	-	-	-	70.5	1.3	3.3
United States	186.6	19.6	40.6	882.4	35.9	57.2	535.1	15.8	59.6	150.8	20.1	36.9	387.5	6.9	18.1
Venezuela	64.9	6.8	14.1	295.7	11.1	19.2	191.1	5.6	21.4	-	-	-	1130.5	20.0	52.7
Sub-total	460.0	48.0	100.0	1541.6	48.4	100.0	893.7	26.4	100.0	408.6	54.5	100.0	2144.8	38.1	100.0
Commercial Bank Suppliers Credits	7.3	-	-	92.2	-	-	2067.1	61.0	-	-	-	-	2057.7	36.5	-
	2.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16.4	-	-	17.7	-	-
Total	949.8	-	-	2522.1	-	-	3384.2	-	-	749.6	-	-	5631.8	-	-

\* Includes debt rescheduled, and also Government of Jamaica, Bank of Jamaica and Jamaica National Investment Company Ltd. Would not necessarily correspond with data from World Debt Tables.

SOURCE: Jamaica CS-DRMS

Table 18

## GDP OF SELECTED CARICOM COUNTRIES 1983-1987

COUNTRY	GDP AT MARKET PRICES EXCHANGE RATE LOCAL CURRENCY TO US\$	
	(US\$mn)	
	<u>1983</u>	
Bahamas	1,750	1.0
Barbados	1,056.5	2.0
Belize	152.7	2.0
Grenada	93.7	2.7
Guyana	484.5	3.03
Jamaica	2,219.0	1.93
St Vincent and the Grenadines	75.7	2.70
Trinidad and Tobago	8,241.7	2.40
Total	14,073.8	
	<u>1984</u>	
Bahamas	1,978	1.0
Barbados	1,151	2.0
Belize	191	2.0
Grenada	101.8	2.70
Guyana	443.9	3.83
Jamaica	2,374.4	3.94
St Vincent and the Grenadines	82.9	2.70
Trinidad and Tobago	8,012.3	2.40
Total	14,335.5	

TABLE 18 (CONTD.)

		<u>1985</u>
BAHAMAS	2141	1.0
BARBADOS	1210.5	2.0
BELIZE	198.3	2.0
GRENADA	115.3	2.7
GUYANA	462.1	4.25
JAMAICA	2009.2	5.55
ST. VINCENT & THE GRENADINES	87.8	2.70
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	7449.0	2.45
TOTAL:	<u>13673.2</u>	

		<u>1986</u>
BAHAMAS	2356	1.0
BARBADOS	1338.5	2.0
BELIZE	215.8	2.0
GRENADA	128.7	2.7
GUYANA	519.7	4.27
JAMAICA	2427.7	5.48
ST. VINCENT & THE GRENADINES	94.6	2.70
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	4747.2	3.60
TOTAL:	<u>11827.7</u>	

		<u>1987</u>
BAHAMAS	2524.0	1.0
BARBADOS	ERR	2.0
BELIZE	425.5	2.0
GRENADA	139.1	2.7
GUYANA	344.0	9.76
JAMAICA	2862.9	5.49
ST. VINCENT & THE GRENADINES	ERR	2.70
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	4425.0	3.60
TOTAL:	<u>12170.5</u>	

Table 18 (a)

PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN GDP 1983-1987  
(IN CONSTANT PRICES)

	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>
Bahamas	3.2	6.4	5.2	1.4	4.6
Barbados	0.4	3.6	1.2	5.1	2.5
Belize	0.8	0.8	2.3	1.5	5.0
Grenada	1.4	5.4	4.9	5.5	6.0
Guyana	-9.3	2.1	1.0	0.2	0.7
Jamaica	2.3	-0.9	-4.7	1.9	5.2
St. Vincent & the Grenadines	5.8	5.3	4.6	7.2	5.7
Trinidad & Tobago	5.2	-7.1	-4.6	-0.1	-6.1

Source: ECLAC "The Impact of External Sector Developments on Caribbean Economic Performance 1983-1988.

Table 19

GUYANA: GOVERNMENT BORROWINGS BY USE OF FUNDS  
(PERCENTAGE)

<u>DOD by use of funds, end 1987</u>	<u>%</u>
Project	51.6
Programme	7.8
Cash	16.2
Commodity	16.5
Compensation	5.8
Other	2.1

Source: Guyana CS-DRMS.

Table 21

SERVICE PAYMENT ON PUBLIC EXTERNAL DEBT FOR SELECTED  
CARICOM COUNTRIES 1983-1987


(US\$ millions)

	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Bahamas	44.3	55.1	51.0	42.9	49.6
Barbados	28.3	28.0	43.9	56.8	70.6
Guyana	51.3	36.0	24.6	32.2	25.4
Jamaica	263.8	260.6	395.1	434.8	437.2
Trinidad & Tobago	304.0	409.8	404.0	336.5	404.0
Total	691.7	789.5	918.6	903.2	986.8


Source: IADB Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 1989 Report.




# External Debt of Selected Caribbean States




## Composition of External Debt




# Components of External Debt(mn US\$)



# Total External Debt/GDP



# Long Term Debt/GDP For CARICOM States



## % Change in Debt Components

